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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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Article on U.S.-CIS Strategic Arms Reduction

HK1004140992 Beijing FAZHI RIBAO
in Chinese 24 Mar 92 p 4

[Article by Xi Shunguang (1873 2562 0342): "'Pas de Deux' of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] Recently, the United States, Russia, and other nuclear-armed republics of the former Soviet Union conducted a series of diplomatic activities on nuclear disarmament, ways to prevent nuclear proliferation, and other current major nuclear arms control issues, which aroused extensive attention from world opinion.

The first issue to be solved on U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control is whether or not a unified command can be achieved for the various kinds of nuclear weapons possessed by the countries of the CIS. Can all the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan be ultimately concentrated in Russia? Since the founding of the CIS, there have been sharp conflicts centering around the issue of unified command of strategic nuclear forces between Russia and other CIS member states. Russia stands firmly for a unified command of CIS strategic nuclear forces and that the power of command should be in the hands of the CIS Defense Ministry, which is mainly controlled by the Russians. However, because of a fear of a revival of Russian chauvinism and in hope of maintaining their own status in the CIS and the international community, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan favor participating in the command of CIS nuclear forces. At the CIS summit meeting held in early February this year, no official agreement on this issue was reached by the participants. U.S. Secretary of State Baker and Undersecretary for International Security Affairs Bartholomew have visited the relevant countries of the CIS many times and have a hand in solving this issue. The leaders of Britain and France have also spoken repeatedly on this issue in meetings with the Russian president. After a series of complications, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan at last unofficially expressed that they were willing to give up their nuclear status and that they would either destroy nuclear weapons on their territories before 1995 or would transport the weapons to Russia. Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Byelarus made commitments to the West one after the other to abide by all nuclear disarmament agreements reached between the former Soviet Union and the United States, including the "U.S.-Soviet Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Weapons" signed in 1991.

The second issue to be solved in U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control is how to cut and destroy the excessively large nuclear arsenals of both sides? At present, international political conditions are ripe for a large-scale reduction in nuclear arsenals. At the end of January this year, U.S. President Bush put forward a new proposal for substantial nuclear disarmament in his State of the Union Speech, embracing strategic nuclear weapons in the army, navy, and air force. Later, the United States further proposed to cut nuclear warheads on both sides

to 4,700 warheads in the United States and 4,400 warheads in the area of the former Soviet Union. Last year, the treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons signed by both sides stipulated that the maximum number for retention would be 6,500 warheads. Yeltsin not only agreed completely to Bush's new proposals on nuclear disarmament, but went even farther, suggesting that 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads be retained by each side, abandoning alert status for nuclear weapons in the CIS, and no longer aiming them at the United States. Yeltsin also expressed that the United States and Russia should jointly develop a strategic defense system and share the achievements. It is reported that both sides are negotiating a new program on nuclear disarmament and that some progress has been made. If a new agreement can be reached by both sides, the next issue to be solved is how to destroy surplus nuclear weapons. It is reported that there are about 27,000 nuclear warheads in the area of the former Soviet Union. Russian officials claimed that the actual number of nuclear warheads possessed by the CIS was 15 to 20 percent higher than estimated, most of which are in the hands of Russia. Kazakhstan controls 1,040 warheads, and Ukraine and Byelarus have a total of 1,312 warheads between them. Russia and the other CIS nuclear states lack the financial and corresponding technical ability to destroy this large quantity of warheads. It is reported that the U.S. Congress has approved \$400 million in financial aid to destroy nuclear weapons in the area of the former Soviet Union.

The final issue to be solved on the "pas de deux" of U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament is how to prevent nuclear proliferation, which is one of the most crucial issues. Although both sides are making efforts to cut nuclear weapons numbers, yet the problem of leakage in nuclear technology and personnel from the former Soviet Union has begun to loom large. According to sources, some countries have expressed a deep interest in employing former Soviet nuclear experts and buying CIS nuclear technology. Some of them have even proposed specific terms. In this regard, U.S. Secretary of State Baker reached an agreement with Yeltsin during his recent visit to Russia. Both sides will establish an international science and technology research institute which will employ nuclear weapons experts from the former Soviet Union. The U.S. administration will allocate \$25 million as funds from the \$400 million approved by Congress. Baker indicated that nuclear arms control must be stepped up in the former Soviet Union, international treaty obligations must be observed, and nuclear proliferation must be strictly prevented. Only by doing so can they expect to obtain economic assistance from the West.

Various signs from the aforementioned situation show that in the "pas de deux" of U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament, the United States has the initiative in its hands, while the pride of the CIS, the nuclear superpower of old, has been completely punctured and its equal position no longer exists. Under such circumstances, Russia has in effect given tacit consent to the

principle of nonreciprocity for nuclear disarmament and is willing to act as a second-class nuclear power. But, the question is: Some people hope that other nuclear countries will also take part in the U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament game and will dance on the same stage. Nevertheless, certain prerequisites are necessary to realize international nuclear disarmament. A basic condition of is that it is impossible to talk about balanced arms reduction and the realization of common security unless everyone's nuclear arsenal is at the same level. Given that Yeltsin's minimum nuclear disarmament target of 2,500 warheads is achieved, they will still have more warheads than Britain, France, and China combined. That is why it is probably too early to ask the other nuclear powers to join dancing at the U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament club.

Defense Minister Meets Seminar Participants

HK1504125092 Beijing XINHUA Hong Kong Service in Chinese 1207 GMT 5 Apr 92

[Text] Beijing, 5 Apr (XINHUA)—Chinese Defense Minister Qin Jiwei today met representatives to a quadripartite seminar sponsored by China, the United States, Japan, and Russia on the "security issue in the Asia-Pacific region."

Representatives attending the seminar were famous strategic researchers, including Frank Carlucci, former U.S. defense secretary; General Masao Ishii, former chairman of the Japanese Self-Defense Corps Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Sergey Rogov, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canadian Studies Institute.

Qin Jiwei said: At a time when the world situation is turbulent and complicated, it is significant for representatives from the four countries to exchange opinions on the Asia-Pacific region's security, to seek peaceful and stable factors, and to improve mutual understanding and friendship.

Report on CIS Republics' Talks on START Implementation

OW1204014092 Beijing XINHUA in English 0122 GMT 12 Apr 92

[Text] Moscow, April 11 (XINHUA)—Foreign ministers from four countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) discussed here today the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union.

After the talks, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said at a press conference that through the discussion, the four countries had "narrowed all their differences".

A decision on how to implement the treaty by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan will be made soon.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko told the press conference his country should take part in the settlement of the CIS nuclear weapons issue on an equal footing with other CIS nuclear states. He reaffirmed Ukraine's stand to become nuclear-free.

The four nuclear countries had reached an agreement on eliminating all tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan before July 1, but Ukraine announced later that it suspended the transfer of its tactical nuclear weapons to Russia.

According to the central television, Russia has 15,000 pieces of nuclear weapons, Ukraine 6,000, Belarus 2,000 and Kazakhstan 1,200.

CIS Border Troop Reduction Talks Held in Beijing

OW1604130192 Beijing XINHUA in English 1245 GMT 16 Apr 92

[Text] Beijing, April 16 (XINHUA)—The sixth round of talks on the reduction of military forces on the border and the strengthening of mutual trust in the military field was held here from March 21 to April 16 between the Chinese delegation led by Ambassador Wang Ganghua and the delegation representing the Russian Federation and others led by Ambassador G.V. Kireev [name and title as received].

According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the two sides exchanged views on the contents of the related agreements in a friendly and practical atmosphere, and achieved certain progress. Both sides agreed to hold their next round of talks in Moscow.

During their talks, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei and General Xu Xin, deputy chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, met with Ambassador Kireev and his delegation on separate occasions.

Kireev and his party also toured Shanghai and Nanjing.

JAPAN

SDP Endorses Asia-Pacific Security System

OW1104120192 Tokyo KYODO in English 1122 GMT
11 Apr 92

[Text] Kobe, April 11 KYODO—Social Democratic Party (SDP) Chairman Makoto Tanabe called Saturday for establishing a multilateral security system in the Asia-Pacific region.

The leader of Japan's largest opposition party made the call during a policy speech at a meeting of the SDP's shadow cabinet, which he set up last September to prepare for the event of a power change. Tanabe urged for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Asia and the Pacific.

On the possible future formation of an SDP-led coalition government, Tanabe called on social democratic forces to consolidate their political base to pave the way for a coalition. The SDP, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the United Social Democratic Party are regarded as social democratic forces.

Tanabe said that in a coalition his party could tie up with what he called "liberal and reformist elements" within the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Regarding the policies of the coalition government, Tanabe said the coalition will advance and develop the achievements and policies started by the Liberal Democratic Party government, hinting at a continuation of basic LDP policies.

MONGOLIA

Officials Expect CIS Troops To Withdraw as Scheduled

Defense Minister Comments

OW0204070392 Beijing XINHUA in English
0555 GMT 2 Apr 92

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, April 2 (XINHUA)—The Mongolian minister of national defence, Shagalya Jadambaa, said today he hoped that the troops of the former Soviet Union would withdraw as scheduled.

He said the agreement reached by the two countries in 1990 stipulated that the withdrawal should be completed before August 30 this year.

The removal of military equipment and weapons was already in progress and the troops and their families would leave after May 1.

He added that the barracks left by troops after their withdrawal in 1989 and 1990 had been turned over gratis to Mongolia. The fate of those left in 1991 and 1992 was still to be negotiated.

Foreign Ministry Statement

OW2803141292 Beijing XINHUA in English
1352 GMT 28 Mar 92

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, March 28 (XINHUA)—The Mongolian Foreign Ministry says in a statement today that Mongolia's position on the withdrawal of former Soviet troops is unchanged.

The agreement reached by Mongolia and the former Soviet Union in 1990 for the withdrawal of the troops between 1990 and 1992 is still effective, the statement says, as Russia has taken over Soviet foreign affairs.

The statement stresses that Mongolian Premier Dashiyn Byambasuren reiterated the Mongolian position when visiting Russia recently and that both sides agreed to complete the withdrawal by 1992 as scheduled.

POLAND

Walesa, Yeltsin To Sign Troop Withdrawal Treaty*LD1304221192 Warsaw PAP in English 1944 GMT
13 Apr 92*

[Text] Warsaw, April 13—The treaty on withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland initialled last autumn will be signed during Lech Walesa's meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin when the Polish President visits Moscow, First Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation Gen. Pavel Grachev said here Monday. Grachev is heading a Russian delegation for the 17th round of the Polish-Russian negotiations on financial settlements connected with the pullout of former Soviet troops.

The Russian side has assured that the talks will be successfully concluded within the next two or three days, acting Defence Minister Romuald Szeremietiew told newsmen following the Monday meeting with Gen. Grachev. According to Szeremietiew, however, there existed some very serious problems in respect of financial settlements. In his opinion the Russian side was making exaggerated demands. He said the sites taken over from the Russians were not in as flourishing a condition as the Russian side maintained.

Gen. Grachev stressed in a conversation with PAP reporter that in keeping with the treaty initialled last autumn "not a single Russian soldier will remain on the Polish soil by the end of 1993."

The Russian delegation also met Monday with head of the National Security Office at the Presidential Chancellery Jerzy Milewski. Deputy Foreign Minister Jerzy Makarczyk who accompanied the Russian delegation during the meeting refused to disclose any facts concerning the Polish-Russian negotiations which are to be continued on Tuesday.

Troop Talks With Russia 'Difficult'*LD1404183292 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1730 GMT 14 Apr 92*

[Text] Jerzy Makarczyk, deputy minister of foreign affairs, has described the Russo-Polish negotiations on financial conditions for the withdrawal of troops of the former USSR from Poland as difficult. General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, government plenipotentiary for the stationing of Soviet forces in Poland, said that the results of the talks might not satisfy President Lech Walesa. According to General Ostrowski, quoted by PAP, there might be a question mark over the planned trip by the president to Moscow where the signing of the Polish-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Poland is expected.

According to the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for the Stationing of Soviet Forces in Poland, there are still about 35,000 Soviet soldiers in our country. From 8 April last year to 1 April this year about 10,000

soldiers left Poland. The Russians claim that 18,000 soldiers were withdrawn. Differences ensue from the fact that Poland does not monitor the traffic on the Soviet airfields in our country.

Walesa, Russian Envoy Discuss Troop Withdrawal**Optimistic on Agreement***LD1504152792 Warsaw PAP in English 1404 GMT
15 Apr 92*

[Text] Warsaw, April 15—President Lech Walesa received first Russian Deputy Defence Minister and plenipotentiary for the withdrawal of Russian troops from abroad Gen. Pavel Grachev in the Belvedere Palace in Warsaw Wednesday.

"The epoch calls upon us to develop new relations and at the same time there are unsolved questions," said the President welcoming Gen. Grachev. "Unless we show understanding and rise somewhat higher, we can impede building up (these relations)."

President Walesa voiced conviction "that we will have enough imagination to build up" and to deem the exact settlement of accounts between both states impossible and to "leave them to the pages of history."

Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski and head of the national security office Jerzy Milewski took part in the meeting.

After Wednesday meeting with Minister Skubiszewski, First Russian Deputy Defence Minister Gen. Pavel Grachev said that he could not give details of the 7-point agreement on financial issues of withdrawing troops of the former Soviet Army from Poland because both minister Skubiszewski and he "should present the text (of the agreement) to the governments and the presidents of both states" before initialling it.

Gen. Grachev said that the agreement contained three basic elements envisaging that Poland will help withdraw troops to Russia, that joint Polish-Russian ventures will be set up using some former facilities of the Soviet Army and that Polish assistance to withdrawing troops will not burden the Polish budget.

The general voiced an opinion that the Russian President and Government "will agree with the document."

The talks with minister Skubiszewski covered not the essential contents of the agreement but only stylistic editing of some of its seven points, Gen. Grachev added.

"Gen. Grachev pointed out that they (Russians) had definite domestic difficulties: They were recently withdrawing 150,000 soldiers annually from countries where Soviet troops had been stationed," Walesa's Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski said explaining that "this was not an attempt to exert pressure on us to make any concessions but was said to inform us."

The spokesman also told journalists that Grachev had renewed President Boris Yeltsin's invitation for Lech Walesa to pay a visit to Russia. According to the spokesman, President Walesa stressed that there were no political obstacles to pay such a visit. "Its date will be fixed through diplomatic channels," Drzycimski said.

President Lech Walesa stressed that a treaty on good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation and the agreement on the withdrawal of troops (together with a protocol on its financial aspects) would serve as a basis for developing Polish-Russian relations on entirely new principles, beneficial to both sides. He also emphasized the significance of the best possible Polish-Russian relations.

The new situation creates conditions for paying the visit by President Lech Walesa to Moscow possibly soon, a communique of the president's press office says.

Minister Skubiszewski termed the 17th round of talks on the withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet army from Poland, completed Wednesday, as a "striving to end talks on issues related to this topic." He made the statement during a meeting with journalists Wednesday.

The minister said that participation of Gen. Pavel Grachev, authorized by President Yeltsin, in the talks "made it possible to make progress on the issue that have been lasting too long." He also said that the document adopted Wednesday was confidential and should be treated "as a draft that requires approval by the constitutional bodies of the two states." It solves, by way of compromise, the hitherto disputable economic and financial aspects of the stationing and withdrawing of troops of the former Soviet army.

Minister Skubiszewski added that issues of ecological damage remained to be solved as "so far Gen. Dubynin had refused to let Polish experts into Russian military

units." Minister Skubiszewski settled this problem during talks with Gen. Grachev.

In reply to the question whether the approval of Wednesday's decisions by the constitutional bodies of the two states was the only condition for President Walesa's visit to Moscow, Minister Skubiszewski said that when the ecological issues are solved, the visit can be paid as soon as its programme is fixed.

He added Deputy Foreign Minister Jerzy Makarczyk discussed preparations to the visit with Russian top officials in Moscow on Wednesday.

General Denies Walesa Dissatisfied

*LD1504225292 Warsaw PAP in English 2213 GMT
15 Apr 92*

[Text] Warsaw, April 15—Government plenipotentiary for the Soviet troops in Poland General Zdzislaw Ostrowski denied having said last Tuesday that "President Lech Walesa may not be satisfied" with the outcome of the latest round of Polish-Russian talks on the financial aspects of Russian troops pullout from Poland.

General Ostrowski wrote in a statement released to PAP on Wednesday that he had not talked to the press during the talks or after them and that he had made no comments whatsoever about the political implications of disagreements between the negotiating sides.

However, four journalists representing the Polish press agency PAP, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Radio Free Europe, and Polish Radio programme 1 confirmed that they heard the general say so during a break in the talks when the reporters talked with a group of negotiators.

The journalists stressed that Ostrowski had made no hint about confidential character of his statements.

GENERAL

EC Members Discuss Fate of USSR Weapons

Meet With Deputy Foreign Minister

LD0504203192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1427 GMT 3 Apr 92

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov today received the ambassadors of 12 EC member countries accredited to Moscow and also the head of the EC mission. According to the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry information department, there was a detailed conversation on military-political problems, including matters linked with the fate of the former USSR's nuclear weapons and implementation of the treaties on strategic offensive armaments and conventional armed forces in Europe. It was stressed on the Russian side that as the USSR's successor state Russia is ready to the maximum extent to ensure fulfilment of its obligations under these agreements and other accords concerning nuclear disarmament and conventional armaments. The ambassadors expressed concern over the future fate of the nuclear potential on the territory of the former USSR and declared their countries' interest in reaching a prompt accord in this sphere and also on matters connected with the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in which CIS states are also participants.

START Ratification Suspended

LD0304201792 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1730 GMT 3 Apr 92

[Text] Kolokov, Russian Federation deputy foreign minister, received the ambassadors of the 12 EC member states accredited to Moscow and the head of the EC mission today. In the course of the conversation, which revolved around military and political problems, the ambassadors expressed concern over the future of the nuclear potential on the territory of the former USSR.

In an interview with the Mayak radio station, Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security, admitted that the process of the ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons (START) has been suspended.

[Begin Piskunov recording] The treaty must be ratified on a bilateral basis—by the United States and by Russia as the successor of the USSR. This procedure was coordinated beforehand with three other CIS states that have nuclear weapons on their territory. At the concluding stage in Kiev, however, Ukraine effectively foiled the conclusion of the draft agreement because of just one word. At the beginning, it was Kazakhstan that wanted to remove brackets from the word in question. But then this position was developed by Ukraine, and the signing of the agreement was foiled.

In these conditions, parliament had to suspend ratification. A fundamentally new situation has arisen. I believe that in many respects it is the consequence of the provision under which strategic nuclear forces have no state status in this country. They belong to the CIS, something that is unacceptable from the point of view of international bodies. There must be someone clearly in charge of issues relating to nuclear security and responsibility for everything that can happen to nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation has been instructed now to find methods as soon as possible for coordinating existing positions and for removing the obstacles that have arisen to concluding the treaty. [end recording]

'No Backing Down' in Byelarus Disarmament Plan

LD0404110192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1650 GMT 3 Apr 92

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent Larisa Lazar]

[Text] Minsk, 3 Apr (TASS)—Weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—must be banned in the civilized world. This is the gist of the dialogue that took place between Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Byelarusian Supreme Soviet, and chairmen of the committee of the international movement International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

Stanislav Shushkevich noted that Byelarus is taking necessary measures to become a nuclear free state. By 1 July it is planned to complete the withdrawal of tactical weapons from the republic and to place under international control the withdrawal of strategic weapons. "It is only now that we understand how difficult it is to carry out disarmament but there will be no backing down in this respect", said the head of the Byelarusian parliament.

Doctor Bernard Lown, head of the delegation, appealed to the leader of the Byelarusian State urging him to support the medics in their fight to halt nuclear tests. He noted the need for the world community to monitor nuclear arms stationed in the CIS countries. "The cold war" has ended but we must fight together for outlawing nuclear weapons. In this connection, Byelarus has unique opportunities, Bernard Lown said.

Cautious Approach to Disarmament Viewed

PM0804163192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Apr 92 First Edition p 6

[Vladimir Gubarev article under the rubric "View of A Problem": "Sober Calculation or Nuclear Madness?"]

[Text] Arzamas-16—The atom bomb has become a superstar. It is constantly talked about on television and written about by journalists and has its merits and

drawbacks discussed by politicians. There is simply no counting the number of "nuclear disarmament experts," each promoting his own action program which immediately begins to be discussed—and, unfortunately, sometimes to be implemented as well.

It is still possible to understand the concern in the West over our nuclear weapons. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to a lowering of the safety threshold of the weapons, and however hard we try to convince the public that "everything is under control," this is not so. After all, hundreds of nuclear warheads are being moved from one state of the CIS to another, and this is already dangerous in itself.

A doctor of sciences who creates nuclear weapons in Arzamas-16 earns a monthly salary which is less than that earned by a cleaner in the White House, and half the official poverty line—this is also a reality. This is why there has been talk of a "brain drain" and the possibility of our nuclear scientists departing to "suspect" countries. In Germany enriched uranium is found in the trunk of an automobile; French television carries mysterious film featuring trade in nuclear charges, and already each of us is almost convinced: This is really what is happening!

Illusions about nuclear weapons are extraordinarily dangerous, but playing games around them can lead to catastrophe. Unfortunately, such games are being played at all levels.

USSR President M. Gorbachev launched a program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The world applauded; commentators—incidentally, the same ones who criticize the president today—sang ecstatic panegyrics. New political and economic doctrines were created, and...No one asked the specialists: Can nuclear weapons really be destroyed by the year 2000, and can this be done at all? Suddenly it became clear that this is impossible; there is simply not enough time, and besides, economically advantageous and efficient ways of reprocessing weapons-grade plutonium and uranium do not exist at present. I do not know whether M. Gorbachev was informed about the real situation, or whether he had ventured on this step for the sake of political showmanship. I suspect that the president had the wrong consultants—to be more exact, nonprofessionals.

The Russian president has quickly ended up in a similar situation. It is difficult even to imagine who suggested to B.N. Yeltsin the, in my view, quite absurd idea of retargeting missiles away from U.S. cities. This was obviously an uninformed person, because a professional at once explained to me that if nuclear weapons were retargeted from U.S. cities onto, for example, U.S. missile bases, this would be clear proof that Russia was preparing to inflict a first strike against America, in other words, to start a war. "Targeting a city" is nothing other than the "doctrine of deterrence." We will not analyze its effectiveness—that requires a separate discussion—but

it is just such a military strategy that we proclaimed. If the United States is removed altogether from our nuclear sights, then the natural question arises: Where will the missiles be targeted then? Into space? On the south? The east? There is no answer. At first sight, B. Yeltsin's statement sounded "striking," as some sections of the mass media wrote, but this kind of political impact only ever lasts a few days, and then charges of incompetence arise.

The presidents of the sovereign states are vying with one another to demonstrate their attitude to nuclear weapons, and, whether consciously or not, they want to retain the status of "nuclear president." With such an epithet your authority on the planet is somewhat higher. Lamentable though it may be, possession of nuclear weapons, irrespective of personal qualities, makes the leader of a state a "weightier" figure in international cooperation.

The haste of Ukraine and Byelarus in deciding on the status of "nuclear-free states" cannot fail to cause concern. Mention of the nuclear topic is naturally hateful to the peoples of these republics, which were scorched by Chernobyl, and by declaring that they would get rid of nuclear weapons, their leaders increased their prestige. It was announced that tactical nuclear weapons would be fully withdrawn to Russia by as early as the summer of this year. And, just as in the old days, reports quickly appeared to the effect that the target would be fulfilled ahead of schedule! But, dear friends, why did you not explain that transporting weapons, removing them from combat standby, and putting them into storage are operations which brook no haste? Moreover, given the current state of the roads, regularly the scene of crashes, the transfer of a large number of nuclear weapons is dangerous.

Yes, a nuclear explosion can be ruled out even in the event of a train crash—the designers have demonstrated this—but nuclear weapons contain plutonium. The "leakage" of plutonium in an accident would mean a disaster no lesser than Chernobyl. So far things are all right—knock on wood—but why, for the sake of a dubious popularity and applause, make hasty decisions on which people's lives depend? You can make mistakes with the economy, both tactical and strategic decisions are admissible—in the end the people, having suffered for a while, will correct them and punish you. But haste and mistakes where nuclear weapons are concerned are inadmissible: Here the question is of life and death.

Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk unexpectedly made the decision to suspend the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons. Possibly someone or other drew his attention to the fact that weapons-grade plutonium and uranium are perhaps the most "valuable commodity" in the modern world. A nuclear charge contains enormous intellectual and material assets which are far more valuable than gold or diamonds. The desire to keep these assets on Ukrainian territory can be understood. But the subsequent statement that an enterprise where nuclear

charges could be dismantled should be created in Ukraine cannot help but put you on your guard—this is madness! Ukraine simply does not have the specialists able to do this, and, moreover, to create such an enterprise would require many billions of rubles, or karbovantsy, as the Ukrainians call them, and perhaps this can no longer be done today either in Ukraine or in Russia, in view of the manifest disintegration of the economy.

B. Yeltsin has visited Arzamas-16. He saw how unique the nuclear weapons complex is. The decision was made to set up federal nuclear centers in Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. I will not conceal the fact that those who work in Arzamas-16 were encouraged by the Russian president's understanding of their needs. Many told me so, from leaders to rank-and-file specialists. But, unfortunately, the apparatus is in no great hurry to fulfill the decisions which were adopted—the centers are still not being financed, and there are only declarations of government aid.

But the West is in a hurry! There they understand perfectly well just what great material and intellectual assets are concentrated in Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. The following incident took place in my presence. Humanitarian aid arrived in Arzamas-16 from Norway—baby food, wheelchairs, dried milk. This tonne of freight was accompanied by 26 people, including about 10 journalists. Thanks are due for the help, of course, but thanks are apparently not enough for the visitors. They wanted to become more closely acquainted with the nuclear center and its work and to talk to the creators of nuclear weapons.

Surely they do not think us quite so poverty-stricken as to be willing to share our nuclear secrets in return for a jar of baby food? The visitors from Norway were welcomed amicably: They were given food and drink and shown splendid kindergartens and churches, of which there are many in these parts. But all the same, an incident occurred during the presentation ceremony for the humanitarian aid—the journalists from Norway no longer concealed their true goals: They were indignant at not being allowed into the "industrial zone." I think they would not have permitted themselves to behave like that in nuclear centers in the United States, France, or Britain. I have been in these places, and I know that the regime is roughly the same everywhere—nuclear secrets are nuclear secrets.

As is well known, glass beads were especially popular among the natives of Polynesia in the era of great geographical discoveries. It was possible to get gold and precious stones in exchange for them. Today, for bits of glass they are substituting "greenbacks." Dollars are an excellent bait to catch simpletons. The furor raised over "the brain drain and the leakage of nuclear technology and materials" in the world press is, in my view, aimed at such simpletons. Moreover, almost anyone who wants to is participating in this game, and the further they stand from the weapons complex, the more active they are. So far not only has not a single specialist involved in

the creation of weapons disappeared anywhere, but none has any intention of so doing. There are very few of them, and their attitude is well known. And now, people who are a long way from Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, who have never seen a nuclear bomb, even from a distance, try to sell themselves as dear as possible—will they suddenly be showered with "greenbacks"? And high ranks and famous institutions are being implicated. The proposal to dismantle a nuclear charge in Red Square or in the lobby of the "Olympiyskiy" [Hotel], with the participation of stars of stage and screen, which was hatched among physicists, testifies to the total ignorance of its initiators. However, the glitter of "greenbacks" is capable of clouding the reason even of people with a high scientific and political education....

The Pentagon has allocated \$400 million to our nuclear disarmament program. There has been public excitement over this sensational report for a good three months now. Naturally, the money was allocated in the form of specific products. In particular, it was proposed to deliver to Russia containers to store weapons-grade plutonium. But an extraordinary thing occurred: It turns out that they already have containers in Arzamas-16, more secure and sophisticated ones too. Americans are practical people and offered to buy the containers from us. And now it is difficult to comprehend who is helping whom. Perhaps the question should be put differently: Should we not be talking of joint work rather than aid?

Recently a prestigious U.S. delegation visited Arzamas-16. The correspondent of the institute house newspaper interviewed Siegfried Hecker, director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Asked about his most vivid impressions, the U.S. nuclear weapons specialist replied laconically: "I am amazed by the high level of your academics and specialists and by your experimental base. The enthusiasm and keenness of your staffs surprised me."

To this I will add just one thing: Our U.S. colleagues were shown only a small proportion of the wealth which our nuclear center possesses. There should be no doubt—in this field at present we are not behind the United States, and in some spheres we are ahead. The Americans are incontestably ahead in some things, especially since they are continuing intensive tests in Nevada, while we have to all intents and purposes not been conducting tests for five years now.

Therefore true partnership lies in mutual cooperation, above all in ensuring the security of nuclear weapons. At least, for as long as they exist. But this is not a technical problem, but an exclusively political one.

At last \$25 million of the "homeless" \$400 million has, it seems, found a use. A. Kozyrev, J. Baker, and H.-D. Genscher have signed the "Trilateral Agreement" in Brussels. The idea is to set up an international scientific and technical center in Russia. The statement says, in particular: "An important goal of projects supported by the center would be to provide academics and specialists

connected with weapons with opportunities to redirect their talents into nonmilitary projects, and especially to minimize any incentives to participate in activity which could lead to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, or missile delivery systems. Through these projects academics and specialists would also assist efforts being made to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, including the elaboration of technologies capable of furthering such efforts. The center would also serve the wider goals of supporting the transition to a market economy responding to civil needs, supporting basic and applied research, and developing technology."

Various documents are appended to this statement. The gist of them is the same: A kind of controlling organ should be set up in Russia to finance the work of our scientists. Now here is the unfortunate part—their work is rated much too cheaply in "greenbacks." The United States is giving \$25 million, Europe and Japan the same. I will say simply for information purposes: In any laboratory at Arzamas-16 it is easy to find entirely specific research work which is "worth" more than this \$75 million...In my view, an international center of this kind is not needed, since its activity is limited only to Russia and certain CIS countries. International cooperation envisages equality among its participants, the joint solution of various problems, and above all, trust in one another. This is not to be found in the documents signed in Brussels.

But it is not so difficult, I think, for the Russian government to find funds for our two nuclear centers. Especially since the money is trifling in comparison with what is being spent today on discussing how to aid our nuclear scientists. We simply need to fulfill the president's decisions.

The Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear centers are just as much a national asset of our motherland as the Hermitage or the Kremlin, the Space Center in the Moscow area, the cosmodrome in Plesetsk, "Uralmash," or the Norilsk combine. The people have paid a high price for their creation. To destroy them is easy, and this is why emotional, hasty decisions are so dangerous. An instantaneous advantage could turn out to be a disaster in the not-so-distant future.

I sometimes hear from friends and colleagues: Why be a "blind hawk" and defend this Arzamas-16, where the most terrible weapons were created?! Of course, it is very easy, and in our times, even profitable to pose as a champion of disarmament, a real dove of peace. As the scientific observer of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and PRAVDA I had occasion to visit uranium mines, nuclear test sites, and nuclear centers, I have seen the horrors of the Chernobyl disaster with my own eyes, and I have met with hibakushi—survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—so it is not just from hearsay that I know about nuclear apocalypse...The fact that so many weapons have been amassed on our tiny planet can only be explained as nuclear madness—and this, unfortunately, is a reality. However, the path of disarmament,

which today is not just a requirement, but a necessity, is extremely complex and, unfortunately, long. Haste or games with the atom bomb must not be permitted.

U.S. Aid Leverage To Encourage Disarmament

PM1304123792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Aleksandr Shalnev: "Struggle for Black Sea Fleet Worries Washington"]

[Text] Washington—The United States is "very concerned" at the latest deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations over the Black Sea Fleet, but not to such an extent as to put its Mediterranean-based fleet on heightened alert status.

Admiral David Jeremiah, vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, said this when answering my questions on Wednesday [8 April].

The Department of State is not panicking in assessing the situation that has developed over the Black Sea Fleet. Margaret Tutwiler, assistant secretary of state, said that Washington is urging Ukraine and Russia "to refrain from taking any unilateral steps and to resolve this problem in such a way as to strengthen stability." The conflict over this problem, she stressed during a conversation with journalists, "is in no one's interests and only diverts attention from the real need to advance with economic and political reforms."

It is noteworthy that Washington does not think, according to M. Tutwiler's statements, that the problem of the Black Sea Fleet will adversely affect the schedule for withdrawing nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory. According to the assistant secretary of state, the administration is convinced that Ukraine will have handed over its tactical nuclear weapons to Russia by 1 July as previously agreed. Despite the fact that the United States has no written guarantees on this.

I suppose that Washington's confidence is to a considerable extent based on its powerful lever for pressure on both Ukraine and Russia—the lever of economic and financial aid. U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker recently made it abundantly clear that the United States would only reward with its aid countries that heed Washington's wishes, including in the sphere of disarmament. On the other hand, one cannot help but notice that the aid package recently announced by Washington and Bonn, estimated at a total of \$24 billion, only allocates \$0.5 billion to Ukraine and the other former Union republics, apart from Russia. In other words one cannot evidently rule out the fact that Kiev will consider its share too small to enable Washington to use this lever against it.

START TALKS

Samara Plant Ends Heavy Bomber Production

PM3103115592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Mar 92 First Edition p 4

[Report by Tatyana Ivanova: "Bombers Retired"]

[Text] Samara—The Samara Aircraft Plant has completely ended production of Tupolev heavy bombers. The enterprise has been one of first of the oblast's defense industry giants to make the virtually painless transition to the production of solely civil output. Today the plant's shops are assembling Tu-154 passenger aircraft.

Backfire Bombers Moved to Kola Peninsula

PM0104135092 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
31 Mar 92 p 8

[Report by Olav Trygge Storvik: "More and More Bombers to the Kola Peninsula"]

[Text] Russia is transferring more and more modern long-range bombers to the Kola Peninsula. A new regiment of Backfire bombers is being brought up to full strength.

A first regiment of Backfire bombers was transferred to the Olenegorsk air base in late 1988 and early 1989. This was the first time that attack aircraft of this type were permanently stationed on the Kola Peninsula and their deployment attracted much attention both in Norway and internationally. The Olenegorsk air base is more or less in the center of the Kola Peninsula, south of Murmansk. In the "Satellite Atlas of the Kola Peninsula," published by researcher Johnny Skorve in collaboration with the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, it is possible to study this base from one of the satellite pictures. The picture shows that over the last few years the base has been extended and now has permanent hangars and other facilities for the deployment of new aircraft.

It is the second regiment of Backfire bombers on the Kola Peninsula which is currently being brought up to full strength, Colonel I. Per Bothun, Defense High Command press spokesman, has confirmed. However, he was unwilling to say at which base the aircraft are stationed. The transfer of long-range Backfire bombers to the Kola Peninsula has been going on for some time and is still going on, Bothun said. The Backfire crews have been trained and tested in Ukraine, but have now been transferred to the Kola Peninsula. Once the second regiment has been brought up to full strength, Russia will have 40 modern long-range bombers in close proximity to Norway. There is also a regiment of Badgers, old bombers from the fifties.

According to Bothun, military exercises on the Kola Peninsula have increased again this year after a low-profile period last year. "We have registered that there are more regular exercises involving ships, aircraft, and ground forces in local areas and waters," Bothun said. There have been exercises involving army forces in the Pechanga valley close to the Norwegian border, but their scale has been below the level which, under the terms of international agreements, would require Russia to notify Norway. The military exercises on land have been restricted to battalion and battery level, and Norway has not given consideration to sending military inspectors to these exercises, Bothun said.

Bothun is unwilling to speculate about why the Russians consider it in their interests to increase long-range weapons systems of the Backfire type in forward areas close to Norway in a period of detente. These aircraft are classed first and foremost as a threat to U.S. aircraft carriers and accompanying ships—that is, forces which are able to bring reinforcements to Norway if the situation were to change suddenly.

"It would be regrettable if the transfer of Backfires to the Kola Peninsula were part of a buildup," Defense Ministry press spokesman Gunnar Angeltveit said. He considers that it would have a less than favorable influence on the climate of cooperation in the north. "But for the time being we are choosing not to read too much into what the Russians are doing," he said. "We are aware that they find themselves in a difficult situation. And for the time being we will give them a certain amount of leeway to find out what to do with the considerable forces of the former Soviet Union."

START Treaty Said Still Relevant

LD1004135692 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by F. Shelov-Kovedyayev, Russian Federation first deputy foreign minister: "The START Treaty Was Signed Last Year. It Remains Relevant Today"]

[Text] The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation [START] has been submitted to the Russian Supreme Soviet for ratification.

This agreement with the United States was signed 31 July last year, and at that time it was in the name of the Soviet Union. Since the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States confirmed at the Minsk meeting their commitment to observe the international treaties inherited from the former USSR, on 11-12 March the four on the territory of which are stationed arms falling under the terms of the START treaty—Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine—reached agreement in general, at the level of deputy foreign ministers and defense ministers, on the procedure for its ratification and practical implementation. In the near future there is to be a meeting of foreign ministers on this matter.

What is the START treaty, and has it lost its significance, now that initiatives in the sphere of strategic arms limitation and reduction seem to have largely overtaken the accords it enshrines?

There is every reason to believe that the treaty has not lost its relevance and remains a useful and necessary agreement. Its implementation will make it possible to ensure the security of Commonwealth member states at a lower and correspondingly safer level of strategic offensive arms and will offer the opportunity ultimately to save substantial financial and human resources that hitherto have gone to maintaining a huge strategic arsenal. The treaty's relevance also is indicated by the fact that the initiatives in the disarmament sphere which have been put forward recently by the sides that drew up the treaty—as far as strategic offensive arms are concerned—take as their jumping-off point the ceilings and limitations it enshrines. Thus the treaty's ratification would legitimize this basis for further progress in the cause of limiting strategic weapons.

In practical terms, the START treaty stipulates the following.

Quantitative reductions In the first seven years of the treaty's operation each side will reduce its strategic offensive arms—that is, ICBM's and their launchers, SLBM's and their launchers, and heavy bombers—to a level of 1,600. The number of warheads attributed to these delivery vehicles will be reduced to 6,000. Within this total ceiling, sublevels are set: 4,900 for warheads attributed to ICBM's and SLBM's; 1,100 for warheads attributed to mobile ICBM's; 1,540 for warheads attributed to heavy ICBM's. The aggregate throw-weight of ICBM's and SLBM's will be reduced to a ceiling of 3,600 tonnes on each side.

In general the duration of the treaty is set at 15 years, but a year prior to that time the sides will examine the question of a possible extension for a further five years, and they may extend the treaty's validity for successive five-year periods thereafter.

The methods of arms reduction are aimed, to the maximum possible degree, not at destroying, but at redirecting toward economic needs what had been used as weaponry. Thus provision is made for the possibility of reequipping the reduced facilities for purposes that do not run counter to the treaty and of eliminating ICBM's and SLBM's by means of launching them into space in order to deliver devices for purposes compatible with the sides' existing international commitments.

On the basis of separate politically binding statements by the sides, the number of sea-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km is limited. The number of such missiles deployed by each side must not exceed 880 during the period of validity of the treaty.

Qualitative limitations The treaty contains provisions imposing substantial limitations on improving strategic offensive arms. The aim is to close possible channels

whereby the arms race could be redirected from the sphere of the quantitative buildup of strategic arsenals to the area of qualitative improvement of such systems. In particular, the following are stipulated:

- A strict procedure for the sides' actions with regard to new (that is, not in existence at the present time) types of strategic offensive arms. In the event that either side obtains a new type of weapon, appropriate notification must be given, and the question of this weapon must be resolved by the two sides within the framework of the Joint Commission for Compliance and Inspections. Furthermore, if either side suspects that the other side is testing a new type of weapon that, in its opinion, could be categorized as strategic, it also may raise this question at the Joint Commission;
- A ban on new types of strategic offensive arms that are already known but are not yet in the armory of either side—"air-to-surface" ballistic missiles (ASBM's) and multiple-warhead long-range nuclear cruise missiles;
- A ban on flight-testing and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of heavy SLBM's, heavy mobile ICBM's, and also new types of heavy ICBM's;
- A ban on equipping any watercraft other than submarines with ballistic missiles;
- A ban on siting ballistic or cruise missile launchers on the beds of the oceans, seas, or inland waters;
- A ban on systems for rapid reloading of ballistic missile launchers;
- A series of bans restricting the range of aircraft that can be used as heavy bombers, ruling out, for instance, the possibility of equipping wide-bodied transport aircraft and civil aviation aircraft with shorter-range nuclear missiles and nuclear bombs;
- A limitation on the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, to 10;
- A strict procedure for downloading warheads on ICBM's and SLBM's, in order to rule out the possibility of rapid restoration of the former number of warheads on these missiles.

Verification With a view to ensuring the sides' strict fulfillment of their commitments under the treaty, a system of verification measures unprecedented in its scope and rigor was formulated.

In the course of agreeing on the limitations stipulated in the treaty, from the outset the sides adopted an approach that would enable each of them to have a clear picture of the state of affairs regarding the other side's strategic offensive arms. The Memorandum of Understanding on initial data that accompanies the treaty indicates the bases at which the relevant armaments are located (based). Undeployed (spare) armaments can be kept only at facilities specifically designated for them: At storage and servicing depots and in a limited quantity (as spares)

at ICBM and SLBM bases or in transit. All changes in the quantity of systems and their basing must be notified.

After the signing of the treaty the sides showed each other their strategic offensive arms, so that they were able to see for themselves that the technical characteristics of these systems that were cited in the Memorandum of Understanding are in accordance with reality. This facilitates the process of carrying out verification in the future using national technical means or on-site inspections.

After the treaty's entry into force the sides will carry out inspections with regard to the initial data on the strategic offensive arms in their possession. This is a one-time measure designed to ensure confidence in the accuracy of information on the quantity and types of systems presented by them to each other in the course of the initial exchange of data under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. In all, the system of inspections consists of 12 types of inspection, including, for instance, inspections relating to the number of warheads on ICBM's and SLBM's, inspections in connection with the reequipping or elimination of strategic offensive arms, inspections following the completion of dispersal in the case of exercises involving mobile ICBM launchers, inspections on suspicion, and so forth. A system of continuous monitoring [nablyudeniye] of facilities for the production of mobile ICBM's—on the perimeter and at the portals of such enterprises—is established.

The sides also have the right to submit to each other—on an agreed date once a year—requests for mobile ICBM launchers and heavy bombers to be displayed in the open air. This measure will provide an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of national technical means of verification.

The agreement on banning the encryption, suppression, and encapsulation of telemetric information transmitted during flight-testing of ballistic missiles also will play a part in ensuring reliable verification. Each side thereby will gain confidence that the other side is complying with the treaty provisions relating to the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, the number of stages on such missiles, and the launch weight and throw-weight of ICBM's and SLBM's. (Provisions on the number of stages and the throw-weight and launch weight relate to the procedure stipulated by the treaty for determining whether or not a missile undergoing testing is a new type of ICBM or SLBM.)

The Joint Commission for Compliance and Inspections is intended to be an important instrument for ensuring verification; within its framework the sides will resolve questions relating to the fulfillment of commitments, and also agree on additional measures that may be needed to increase the treaty's viability and effectiveness.

The system of verification measures formulated for the START treaty (or individual elements of it) could act as a precedent for future accords in the arms limitation sphere.

The treaty represents a carefully regulated balance of interests, formulated on the basis of compromise solutions. Reaching these compromises was no easy matter because it was necessary to take into account the differences that have grown up historically in the structures of the sides' strategic arsenals and the characteristics of their deployment: In our strategic arsenal the emphasis was placed on the development of ICBM's, while the United States gave preference to SLBM's; we have mobile ICBM launchers—on railroads and on the ground—in deployment, while the United States has no such systems; we have heavy ICBM's, the United States does not; the United States has superiority in the number of heavy bombers.

The treaty's limitations and verification measures are formulated in such a way that they are not detrimental to either side's interests and that neither side can obtain advantages over the other in the course of the implementation of the treaty's provisions. On our part, for instance, we expressed readiness to reduce by half the heavy ICBM's—which only we have—and not to create new types of such missiles, and we consented to strict verification measures with regard to mobile ICBM's; the U.S. side withdrew its initial demand for a total ban on mobile ICBM's and agreed that the verification measures stipulated for mobile ICBM's should be extended to its own MX ICBM, although that missile is not deployed in mobile form. The United States also withdrew its initial proposals aimed at the gradual "dying out" of our heavy missiles. The U.S. side agreed to include in the treaty a provision on banning ASBM's. The United States accepted the proposal on refraining from basing strategic offensive arms on the territory of third countries. It agreed to categorize as long-range ALCM's [air-launched cruise missiles] missiles of this type with a range in excess of 600 km, and this is an important component of the treaty. The U.S. side agreed to a strict verification regime with regard to heavy bombers.

During the preparation of the treaty our side took into account the relationship between strategic offensive arms reduction and the prevention of an arms race in space. On the basis of our proposal, a provision was included in the preamble to the treaty stating that in concluding the treaty the sides are mindful of their commitments under Article 11 of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Furthermore our side made a unilateral statement, for inclusion in the minutes of the talks, stating that the START treaty can be effective and viable only given compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed on 26 May 1972, and that the exceptional circumstances in which a side may withdraw from the treaty also include circumstances arising in connection with the withdrawal

of either side from the ABM Treaty or in connection with a significant violation of that treaty.

'Nuclear Republics' Discuss Strategic Future

Foreign Ministers Meet

*LD1104124592 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 11 Apr 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Rina Mishina] The four nuclear republics of the Commonwealth—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus are today deciding the question of the future of their nuclear weapons. Presently, there are 15,000 nuclear weapons on the territory of Russia, in Ukraine 6,000, in Byelarus 2,000, in Kazakhstan 1,200. Experts believe 80 percent of all of our strategic missile potential is located in Russia.

[Correspondent Sturua] Questions of strategic offensive weapons are being discussed, including the fate of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing strategic armaments signed 1 August last year by Gorbachev and Bush. The treaty has not yet been ratified, but the fate of the countries of the CIS and the whole world depends to a large extent on its implementation.

Taking part in the conference in the Russian Foreign Ministry are the foreign ministers of Russia, Andrey Kozyrev; of Ukraine, Anatoliy Zlenko; of Kazakhstan, Tuleutai Suleymenov; and Byelarus, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Senko.

The meeting is being held behind closed doors, but we have learned that the sides are expressing readiness to fulfill the provisions of the treaty.

We will inform you of the results of this meeting in our next bulletins.

[Mishina] Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Baker has stated that the volume of U.S. aid to Ukraine could be reduced if Kiev does not fulfill its obligations to transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction.

[Correspondent M. Osokin] U.S. officials say they are worried by a possible change in Ukrainian policy on nuclear weapons. They are not referring to last month's events when Kiev halted the withdrawal of charges to Russia. Now the Americans are worried about other signals. The Canadian Press agency has reported that the Ukrainian parliament will soon begin discussing military policy and may review its position on the nuclear question. The words of the well-known parliamentary Deputy Khmara are quoted, saying an increasing number of his colleagues are coming around to the idea of preserving Ukraine as a nuclear power.

The republic has on its territory the second largest, after Russia, grouping of nuclear weapons. They include two

bases of SS-19 and SS-24 intercontinental missiles and SS-24 in Khmelnytsky and Pervomaysk. And according to the WALL STREET JOURNAL, Ukrainian representatives confirm their resolve to get rid of missiles due for destruction under the Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing strategic armaments, but they let it be understood that they are not prepared to hand over the remaining missiles, to be precise the 46 SS-24 missiles. Ukrainian officials say they want to keep these missiles for themselves, noting these missiles do not fall under any international agreement.

Kozyrev Expects Early Resolution

*LD1104224292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1839 GMT 11 Apr 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Apr—The meeting of the heads of the foreign policy departments of Byelarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia on issues of strategic offensive weapons were fruitful since we narrowed down all the different readings to the essence of the matter. The sides have reached the stage where a political decision should be made," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev stated at a news conference today at the end of the talks. [quotation marks as received]

The treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons was signed in August last year by U.S. President George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, who was then still president of the USSR. At today's meeting the ministers of the four states that have nuclear weapons on their territory were faced with discussing the issue of carrying out their obligations with regard to this treaty, as well as who is subject to it in place of the disintegrated USSR. The parliaments of the republics have not yet ratified the treaty.

In Andrey Kozyrev's opinion, the parliaments and governments of the four republics should definitively set out their positions on this fundamental issue. Work can only be continued if this is done. If agreement is successfully reached in principle that there will be one nuclear state on the territory of the former USSR, then it is only a matter of mutually acceptable wording. "A political resolution on this issue remains to be made, but I am sure that it will be adopted in the near future," the minister noted.

Ukraine is extremely committed to achieving a decision on the matter, said Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko. Each state, he said, wishes to take upon itself its share of the responsibility connected with the ratification of the treaty and carrying out its tenets. Ukraine's position is that it, as a sovereign independent state, should take part in the resolution of issues ensuing from international obligations on an equal basis. In the declaration of the state sovereignty of Ukraine, Zlenko stated, Ukraine's intention to become a non-nuclear state is clearly set out. We are full of resolve to bring this about, he said.

Ratification Has 'Come To a Halt'

LD1104153792 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1230 GMT 11 Apr 92

[From the "Panorama" program]

[Text] A meeting of the foreign ministers of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine on the subject of ensuring fulfillment of the Soviet-American treaty limiting and cutting strategic offensive weapons is taking place in Moscow. Our special correspondent, Vladimir Pasko, is on the line:

[Pasko] Hello, comrades. The meeting opened without any statements for the press. Moreover, as they walked past journalists into the conference room, the heads of the delegations made abundantly clear that they did not wish to answer questions. To a certain extent, this is a reflection of the difficulty of the talks that have begun. Although all the republics that have on their territory weapons subject to reduction have declared their commitment to the treaty, the process of ratification has come to a halt. Literally, formally, this has happened because of a dispute over the ratification procedure. Under the terms of the treaty, it was meant to be ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union no longer exists, and the treaty is supposed to be ratified by Russia, the USSR's legal successor. However, the Ukrainian leadership insists that the other three republics which have strategic offensive weapons on their territory also be party to the ratification.

By the way, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko confirmed this stance today when he answered journalists' questions during a break between sessions. In practice, this would mean recognition of those republics as nuclear states and, with it, the end of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Critics of the Ukrainian stance also note that the Soviet-American Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons does not destroy those weapons completely: some of them remain on the territory of all three states, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Even if it is assumed that Ukraine and Byelarus actually keep their promise to become nuclear-free, Kazakhstan has given no such commitments.

Moreover, in the Alma-Ata agreements Kazakhstan sidestepped the issue of joining the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In one statement President Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan would destroy the nuclear weapons on its territory as the others—meaning the United States, Britain, France, and China—did the same. In other words, the dispute over the ratification procedure is no trifling matter. One can see in the behavior of the former Union republics a desire to keep nuclear weapons, at least for a certain period.

It should be said that before the meeting in Kiev the sides found a compromise at the level of experts. What it

amounted to is that each party is free to act as it wishes. If anybody wanted to perform the ratification for himself, he could do so, but Russia would remain the sole nuclear power, and this was laid down in the draft agreement. But it was that clarification which meant that the problem of ratification could not be settled at the Kiev meeting.

The experts are now forced to work out an agreement again. Will they be able to reach agreement? Evidently, the answer might become known after 1745 hours [1345 GMT], when the experts are due to complete their work—according to the schedule, at least—and following the meeting of the heads of the delegations which is supposed to begin after that. Foreign Minister Zlenko voiced certainty that the problem would be resolved, but we had better wait and see.

While the experts have been working, the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers have held talks of their own. It follows from their answers that their attention was focused on the situation in the Dniester region and the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet.

Regarding the Dniester region, the sides expressed themselves in favor of holding another quadrilateral meeting, meaning Moldova, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine. Concerning the Fleet, this issue was discussed in general terms. Talking to your correspondent, the head of the Ukrainian delegation confirmed the principle behind his leadership's stance, which is that the Fleet must be divided. He said that Ukraine has no claims on the strategic part of the Fleet. According to our foreign minister, Kozyrev, a special commission that will deal with the specific issues of dividing up the Fleet is due to meet very soon.

Admittedly, it is not clear where the commission will meet. Ukraine has proposed that the commission meet in that country, but not in Kiev. At the same time, it has objected to the commission meeting in Moscow or in Foros, which, as you know, is in the Crimea, and the Crimea is also a subject of dispute between Ukraine and Russia.

Vladimir Pasko, especially for the Mayak Saturday Panorama.

'Discrepancy' in Ukraine's Claim Eyed

LD1204144492 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1330 GMT 12 Apr 92

[Text] Talks between the foreign ministers of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine on issues connected with the implementation of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Arms finished in Moscow late yesterday evening. In spite of a certain proximity of views, the ministers failed to decide who should be the subject of this treaty after the disintegration of the USSR.

The foreign media regards this as a failure of the talks. The question arises: What really did happen at these talks? I asked this question of my colleague Vladimir Pasko, who also spent the whole day yesterday at the Foreign Ministry's mansion on Aleksey Tolstoy street.

[Pasko] As far as laconic comments and replies to journalists' questions on the results of the meeting by the heads of the delegations allow us to judge, yet again everything was stuck on who should ratify the treaty on the side of the USSR.

Ukraine continues to insist that all states who have nuclear weapons on their territory should participate in the ratification. Every state wants to take its share of responsibility connected to the ratification and implementation of formalities, which will follow, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko stated.

Russia rejects this position, pointing to the fact that this calls into question the treaty on strategic offensive arms, which is bilateral and not five-sided. Besides, this position also calls into question the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which establishes that there are only five nuclear powers in the world, and others, who have nuclear weapons on their territory, are not regarded as nuclear powers, though they take part in deciding the fate of these weapons as, for example, Germany or Italy. Admitting the full equality of former Soviet republics in observing the treaty, Russia insists that it should be recognized that it has the right to ratify it as the state-side of the treaty.

According to Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Byelarus and Kazakhstan are ready to reflect this right in an agreement. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko refused to confirm it, alleging that he needed an appropriate decision by his parliament.

Replying to the question of how the Ukrainian position could be joined to the preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty, Zlenko refuted suspicions that Ukraine had tried to take possession of its own nuclear weapons.

[Begin Zlenko recording] We proceed from the fact that we are a nuclear-free state. We proceed from the fact that there are nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. We stated that they are here on a temporary basis. We also proceed from the fact that we, as a nuclear-free state, might join the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and sign an appropriate agreement with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] concerning guarantees. The point is that the declaration of state sovereignty clearly and synonymously underlined Ukraine's intention to become a nuclear-free state, and we intend to implement this intention. [end recording]

[Pasko] Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev immediately noted a discrepancy between this position and Ukraine's claim to participate in the ratification of the treaty.

[Begin Kozyrev recording] If Ukraine is a nuclear-free state and in the near future becomes a member of the

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nuclear-free state, then it is absolutely unclear how it can be a side in the treaty on strategic offensive arms, which just deals with the nuclear arsenal. This is indeed a somewhat technical discrepancy which needs to be removed. If this is under discussion, then everything is much simpler than we think. [end recording]

[Pasko] One can talk about intentions as much as one wants but in affairs, moreover, in international affairs, only what is registered in agreements is of value. As of today, there is no accord between the republics with regard to how the treaty on strategic nuclear arms should be ratified. And though all four states represented at the conference expressed full interest in the treaty coming into force immediately which, let me remind you, envisages a 30 percent reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the former USSR, the possibility of this is, at least, being delayed. This is obvious to everyone. I can say that the participants in the talks as well as the journalists who covered the talks left last night in a gloomy, if not depressed, mood.

'Lack of Accord' on START Implementation

OW1304142792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1303 GMT 13 Apr 92

["START" Treaty: 1+4?"—from "Diplomatic Panorama"; by diplomatic correspondents M. Mayorov and I. Porshnev—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian Foreign Ministry officials have voiced concern about the process of ratifying the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed last August by the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and his American counterpart George Bush. Today its coming into force is in question, since strategic arsenals of the former USSR now belong to four CIS countries.

On Saturday [11 April] the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan tried at their meeting in Moscow to work out the principles and procedure of implementing the START Treaty. However their attempts were unsuccessful, even though at Thursday's hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had made it clear that the lack of accord among the Commonwealth's four nuclear states might have grave consequences.

According to data available to DP [Diplomatic Panorama], the U.S. expressed its concern also during the telephone conversation between Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and the Secretary of State James Baker held on Saturday after the fruitless quadrilateral talks in Moscow. J. Baker told his Russian counterpart that the treaty could not be submitted to the Congress for ratification as long as there was no clarity in the situation in the CIS.

A highranking Russian diplomat interviewed by DP's correspondent believes that "the failure of the talks in Moscow delayed the ratification of the START Treaty.

And if we take into account that the U.S. is at the height of its presidential election campaign, the treaty might fail to be subjected to ratification altogether."

According to the diplomat, the main obstacle is that Ukraine claims the role of another signatory to the treaty. A way out of this state of affairs can be found, but for this purpose it would be necessary to work out a version suiting Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Alma-Ata and Washington. Judging by what DP learned at Russia's Foreign Ministry, the U.S. suggested the following solution: The CIS would have four signatories to the treaty, but only one nuclear, with the other three confirming their status of non-nuclear countries officially. So far it's hard to say whether the other capitals, above all Kiev, accept this proposal.

The lack of accord among the Commonwealth's nuclear countries also affected, though indirectly, the endeavors to draft an agreement on further cuts in strategic offensive weapons launched by Russia and the U.S. The highranking Russian diplomat interviewed by DP's correspondent said that under the circumstances B. Yeltsin and G. Bush are not likely to sign the proposed agreement during their summit in June. They'll evidently adopt a declaration to state the basic principles of further nuclear disarmament. As for the agreement itself, it will be signed later, when experts work it out.

Russian Spokesman Comments on Meeting

*LD1404173492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1539 GMT 14 Apr 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krovishey and Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—The recent Moscow meeting of foreign ministers from the four CIS states, having the nuclear potential of the former Soviet Union on their territories, focused on the elaboration of an agreement on the procedure of ratification and fulfillment of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive arms.

Unfortunately, meeting participants failed to come to an agreement on this issue, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Directorate Sergey Yastrzhembskiy told a briefing here today.

At the same time, he stressed, they agreed the current situation is no dead end and it is necessary to continue searching for a mutually-acceptable and compromise decision.

The Russian leadership welcomes French decision to suspend nuclear tests, as well as the entire French intensified activities in the disarmament sphere.

Moscow was satisfied with the report the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly ratified the agreement with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] on guarantees in connection with the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

Yastrzhembskiy expressed hope for consistent fulfillment of the agreement, which in the near future will enable another step towards turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

In his speech at the American Society of Newspaper Editors, President George Bush gave a detailed conceptual substantiation, recently made public by the administration, of a package of new and far-reaching measures in support of the Russian reforms, said the Russian Foreign Ministry's official.

"The Russian leadership understands its responsibility before the international community for the fate of democracy in Russia and enhancing of its constructive contribution to world processes," stressed Yastrzhembskiy.

Sanctions against Libya, envisaged by the U.N. Security Council's Resolution 748, will enter into force on Wednesday, recalled the Russian official. Up to the last day before the sanctions' introduction, the Russian Federation did its best to achieve settlement of the Libyan crisis and avoid measures of compulsion as regards this state. However, all the efforts were fruitless.

"In this situation, Russia, fully understanding the special significance for the international community of anti-terrorism activities, will have to begin tomorrow the practical implementation of U.N.-adopted sanctions against Libya, including the termination of air communication with this state, recall of Russian military and military-technical specialists and lowering of the level and reduction of the number of Libyan diplomatic representations," he said.

"We do not dramatize the situation and hope that the incident will not harm the Russian-Belgian relations," said Yastrzhembskiy, commenting the Belgian Government's decision to expel four staffers of the Russian Embassy and trade representation in Belgium for "spy activities".

"We believe such incidents must be excluded from international practice by efforts of all countries, and think the Russian integration with democratic community implies a course towards interaction with partners, including the level of secret services, instead of confrontation," he stressed.

Kozyrev Suggests Dual Treaty Signing

*OW1404130792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1130 GMT 14 Apr 92*

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev suggested a way out of the predicament connected with the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Talks held by the heads of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Kazakh diplomacies in Moscow on Saturday [11 April] yielded no results because of Kiev's

striving to become a full-fledged signatory to the treaty. As for Russia, it proceeds from the need to maintain the bilateral character of the document which was signed by the former USSR and by the U.S. last August.

A. Kozyrev addressed Russian journalists today. According to him, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan could ratify the START Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty simultaneously. This would "help eliminate the possible misinterpretations", he said.

Speaking about the "hot spots" in the territory of the former USSR he visited recently, A. Kozyrev conceded that the endeavors to reach a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh had been futile. Russia's Foreign Minister believes that it's necessary to enter into contact with all sides involved in the conflict confidentially with a view to "finding the path to peace".

With reference to developments in Trans-Dniester A. Kozyrev said that the 14th Army stationed in the area is capable of serving as a buffer between the conflicting sides.

U.S. Seen 'In No Hurry'

PM1404140592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by observer A. Golts: "'Mini-Reykjavik' in Moscow: Republics Have Not Yet Agreed on Fulfilling START Treaty"]

[Excerpts] Treaties, like people, obviously have their own destinies. And the destiny of the Strategic Offensive Arms [START] Treaty is not simple. Hard work has been under way on it for a good 10 years. Through endless talks in Geneva, through the hopes and disappointments of Reykjavik. But it turns out that the difficulties have not ended even with its signing last summer.

On 11 April the START Treaty was again the subject of talks in Moscow. [passage omitted]

At first glance it might seem that the diplomats were not faced with that difficult a task. The treaty has been elaborated and signed. But it was signed by the USSR and the United States. And the Soviet Union no longer exists. That is why the need arose for an additional accord between the four states on whose territory the strategic weapons of the former Union are located. Experts prepared the drafts of an agreement on the principles and procedure for fulfilling the treaty and the protocol to this agreement.

But so far they have not actually succeeded in reaching agreement, although in the common opinion of the four republics' diplomats, the talks have been constructive and positive. [passage omitted]

In my view, there is a very prosaic explanation for everything that is happening. The sovereign republics, and primarily Ukraine, see in the fact that there are nuclear weapons on their territory an opportunity to

strengthen their international prestige. Yes, they are quite reluctant to be nuclear states forever. But at the same time they would not like to lose "responsibility" for nuclear arsenals right now, at the time when their independence is being established.

And if that is indeed so then I fear that the START treaty will be held up for a long time at the ratification stage. After all, Washington will be in no hurry until the republics have settled their differences. Moreover, the problems which have unexpectedly arisen over the treaty which has already been signed cast a rather gloomy shadow on the future of the United States' further strategic arms talks. Answering my question on the subject, Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev did not conceal possible difficulties. If new nuclear states emerge, he said, then that will give rise to a fundamental change in the geopolitical situation. And, if it agrees with this change, Washington will naturally have to conduct talks with each of these states.

The talks in Moscow of representatives of the four sovereign states have in my view become a unique "mini-Reykjavik" within the CIS framework. During the talks the possible limits of compromises were determined. So far these limits have not made it possible to reach an accord. But as is well known Reykjavik eventually lent impetus to a constructive approach. We shall hope that since two states separated by an ocean and decades of hostility have managed to find a common language, then republics which live alongside each other and are united in the Commonwealth will also succeed in doing this. And that will not require long years.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Holds Press Conference

Wants START Participation

LD1404232892 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 14 Apr 92

[Report by correspondent Mykola Marynenko on a news conference by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko with domestic and international correspondents at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry on 14 April; Zlenko's comments recorded]

[Excerpt] [Marynenko] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko's news conference with Ukrainian and foreign journalists lasted just over an hour and was organized after the minister returned from Moscow, where leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Kazakh foreign political departments met. One of the most important issues of that meeting, in Zlenko's opinion, was the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons. Summing up the results of those negotiations, Anatoliy Zlenko noted, in particular:

[Zlenko] The 1991 treaty envisages reducing the number of strategic offensive weapons. That treaty must be ratified as soon as possible by two parties: the United States and the party on the other side. The problem lies

in defining the other party. Russia wants to be the only party to the treaty and to implement it on its behalf and on behalf of the other three countries, i.e. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Byelorussia. We do not want to accept such an approach. Ukraine is prepared to fulfill the clauses of the treaty concerning its territory, including assistance to corresponding inspections by the U.S. party. We have proposed and are proposing that the four states act as one collective party to prevent the treaty's bilateral nature from being broken. Naturally, Russia does not agree with this approach. The Russian side practically shows that reducing nuclear weapons is of much less interest to it, as it seems to us, than the aspiration to show its superiority over the CIS participants. The negotiations have been suspended—they have not broken down—they have been suspended. I think that we are ready to meet again for further negotiations.

[Marynenko] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko also answered numerous questions from the correspondents, including one concerning U.S. Secretary of State Baker's statement linking prospects for humanitarian aid and credits to Ukraine to its nuclear disarmament policy:

[Zlenko] First, we are in constant contact with the United States on various levels and can give the United States direct information on measures we are taking, including the measures on tactical nuclear weapons Baker has mentioned. We have announced that we are consistent in our actions. While it still must be legalized, Russia has proposed a corresponding mechanism to set up interstate control over transferring and destroying nuclear weapons. This is why there are no grounds for either threatening or warning us. One of these days, I think that such a legal mechanism or a legal basis will be created to introduce interstate control and that there will be no grounds for further statements from the United States or from any other side.

[Marynenko] I must stress that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko was asked many questions on the nuclear weapons issue. For example, my colleagues were interested in knowing whether Ukraine will be able to use the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Minister Zlenko replied:

[Zlenko] The Supreme Soviet issued a statement saying that nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory are stationed there temporarily. Second, a presidential decree was issued putting under full jurisdiction...[changes thought] There is a CIS decision stating that strategic nuclear weapons are under the joint command. Currently, we have neither means for its use nor means for its nonuse, apart from political [words indistinct] does not exist, although Ukraine consistently insists on having (?active) technical control over nonuse. What are our forces? We announced that we will remove all tactical nuclear weapons by 1 July 1992 and strategic weapons by 1995. The questions is: Can we do it? We

can do it if we receive the proper help we expect from the other side, including the Western countries. [passage omitted]

Says Tactical Arms Issue Settled

LD1404184892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1750 GMT 14 Apr 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Trotsenko for TASS]

[Excerpts] Kiev, 14 Apr—Ukraine intends to adhere firmly to the principle of achieving a nuclear-free status, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko told a news conference for Ukrainian and foreign correspondents today. [passage omitted]

The minister announced that decisions on tactical nuclear weapons have been drafted already and do not damage Ukraine's interests. The missiles will be sent to Russian territory, where they will be liquidated under the appropriate supervision. [passage omitted]

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Review of Soviet ABM Treaty Stance Urged

924P0113A Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 2, Feb 92 (signed to press 24 Jan 92)
pp 27-34

[Article by S. Federyakov: "Strategic Defense and Political Realities"]

[Text] The turbulent processes occurring on the territory of the former Soviet Union are raising many difficult problems today both for the leaders of the newly formed independent states and for the leaders of Western countries. Among them a great deal of significance is attached to the fate of the nuclear weapons located on the territories of the former Soviet republics—Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Assurances that the nuclear weapons are under reliable control are somewhat depreciated by a certain dissonance which can be heard in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Alma-Ata. Although one must admit that the leaders of the independent states of the former USSR at a conference in the capital of Kazakhstan on 21 December of last year agreed that there must be a unified military-strategic space, unified nuclear deterrent forces, and unified leadership of these forces. To these positions one can quite certainly add a unified strategic defense, which is inconceivable apart from strategic nuclear forces. It would seem that the independent states that are proclaiming their adherence to the norms of international law and the UN Charter should think not only about the fate of the nuclear legacy of the USSR but also about its defense projects.

As we know, in his speech on national television on 23 March 1983 U.S. President R. Reagan announced the

intention of the United States to create a large-scale antimissile defense system with elements of space stationing (SDI). Incidentally, at that time the Soviet Union was invited to participate in this program. Of course, under those specific political conditions it was unrealistic to expect a positive response from the USSR, and the Americans were hardly counting on one. But the fact remains that an invitation was offered.

For a long time now space has been regarded in both the United States and the USSR as a potential location for the development of military strike systems and a possible theater of military operations. The Soviet Union has always been especially concerned about the problem of the use of space for military purposes. This concern increased sharply after R. Reagan proclaimed the SDI program.

During the 1980's the SDI problem became a priority of Soviet diplomacy. At the same time the Soviet Union linked to this program not only the question of the placing space strike weapons in orbit as an additional threat to the country's security but also a number of other problems such as the appearance of "windows of vulnerability," the possible use of future SDI technologies in other areas, both military and civilian, the unification of the forces of the Western world into a unified front against the USSR, and, finally, the disturbance of the strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States.

By that time it was becoming more and more difficult for the country to compete with the United States in the basic strategic technologies which determine the state's military-strategic potential.

Table 1. Comparison of Soviet Union and United States in Basic Strategic Technologies

	1982			1985		
	U.S. superior	USSR and U.S. equal	USSR superior	U.S. superior	USSR and U.S. equal	USSR superior
Aerodynamics		X			X	
Computers	X			X		
Conventional warheads			X		X	
Directed-energy weapons		X			X	
Electro-Optical Sensors	X			X		
Missile guidance systems	X			X		
Time for bringing scientific developments to industrial model	X			X		
Production of new materials		X		X		
Microelectronics	X			X		
Nuclear warheads		X			X	
Optics	X			X		
Mobile energy sources			X		X	
Radar sensors		X		X		
"Stealth" technology	X			X		
Submarine detection systems	X			X		
Power installations	X			X		
Software	X			X		

From Table 1 we can see that while in 1982 the United States was ahead of the USSR with respect to 10 items, in five they were equal, and in two the USSR was ahead, three years later the USSR did not have the advantage in a single technology and was equal in only five, while the Americans were ahead in all other areas. And it must be noted that with respect to such items as "computers," "microelectronics," "Stealth technology," and "submarine detection systems," according to available Western estimates, the Soviet Union lagged hopelessly behind.

On the basis of advanced military-strategic technologies, measures were also developed in the area of antimissile defense. Attention is drawn to the fact that during the

seventies-eighties there was also an increase in the disparity between the USSR and United States in the sphere of defense from ballistic missiles.

As Table 2 shows, during the forties-fifties the time lag between analogous Soviet and American models was five-six years. During the sixties-eighties it had already reached nine to 12 years. There was a quite clearly expressed tendency toward an increase in this disparity in the future as well.

Obviously, to eliminate it would take colossal means, concentration of the best minds and labor resources, and an immense amount of hard work by the whole country.

In addition to the disparity in the area of new strategic technologies, the SDI also presupposed a reduction of the role of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) as means for delivery of nuclear weapons. In this connection, if the strategic defense initiative were realized, the role of the air force and navy would increase significantly and it would be necessary to develop various anti-SDI systems. Taking into account the historical significant advantage of the United States in naval and air forces, in order to achieve a balance in these areas the Soviet Union would have to make considerable additional capital investments.

Table 2. The Arms Race in the Area of Ballistic Missile Defense

	U.S. (years)	USSR (years)
First research in area of ballistic missile defense	1946	1955
First electronic computer	1946	1951
Placement of first early detection radar	1960	1958
First developments of the use of elementary particle flows for military purposes	1958	1970
First tests of antisatellite weapons	1959	1967
First satellite used in military communications	1959	1964
First development of antimissile defense	1967	1961
First developments of high-energy lasers	1962	1965
First use of integrated contours for military purposes	1971	1980

In the middle of the eighties when it was already clear that the Soviet economy was "boggling down," for the USSR to be drawn into such a costly arms race in capital-intensive areas would be tantamount to suicide.

Thus the Soviet Union was extremely unwilling to see the United States develop work on the SDI (the proposal from the United States to include the USSR in research and development in the area of strategic defense was not taken seriously by the Soviet leaders under the conditions of the keen competition of the time).

During the eighties USSR leaders understood that the USSR was not capable of developing a similar program. At the same time the USSR could not agree to a possible violation of the military-strategic parity, which was reflected in repeated statements of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev on the SDI problem. M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that the Soviet Union did not intend to develop its own space nuclear defense system, but if the announced American antimissile defense program were realized, the USSR would take adequate measures to provide for its security and restore the disturbed balance.

The Soviet response to the SDI would be much less costly and would be "asymmetric" in nature.

In Soviet literature there has never been any discussion of the specific programs the USSR could implement in response to the American antimissile defense with elements of space basing; all that were expressed were assumptions that anti-SDI measures would enable the Soviet Union to maintain its nuclear deterrent potential.

According to estimates of Western experts, the implementation of anti-SDI measures could proceed in two directions:

- the implementation of measures making it possible for Soviet ICBM's to penetrate to the attacked objects;
- the development and improvement of antisatellite weapons.

In the opinion of American specialists, the existing technological level would make it possible for the Soviet Union to conduct a number of modernizations and introduce certain developments which would probably increase the survivability of the ICBM's, give them greater penetrating ability, and contribute to a successful fight against U.S. antimissile defense with space elements. The following have been considered as possible variants:

- 1) measures impeding the effects of SDI elements during launching of ICBM's and in the first phase of their flight:

- extensive use of false imitation ICBM launches;
- reduction of the time for putting ICBM's into orbit, which would reduce the time for destroying the carrier;
- ICBM launches with grazing trajectories;

- application to ICBM's of special heat protective coatings, making it difficult to strike the missiles with lasers;

- nuclear explosions in the upper strata of the atmosphere, which would put the space elements of the SDI out of commission or blind them for a certain amount of time;

- 2) possible Soviet countermeasures in the midsection of the ICBM trajectory:

- rapid separation of the warheads from the container;
- the creation of a large number of false targets for the SDI system (according to American estimates, one heavy Soviet carrier puts four tonnes of payload into orbit. Of this, there are 10 warheads weighing 200 kilograms each, and the remaining two tonnes could be made up of false targets, each of which could weigh up to two kilograms. Thus when launching 100 heavy Soviet ICBM's the SDI system would have to deal with 1,000 real warheads and 100,000 false targets;

- coating of the warheads and false targets with aerosol clouds which produce a broad "echoes";
- covering of warheads with a protective shells according to Stealth technology;

3) implementation of measures in the terminal section of the trajectories of Soviet ICBM's:

- nuclear explosions in the upper strata of the atmosphere over the territory of the United States in order to cause malfunctions in the systems for communications, tracking, launching, and interception of elements of the antimissile defense system located in the regions of the objects that are struck;
- concentration of the nuclear strike on the smallest possible number of exceptionally important strategic centers of the United States, overcoming the ABM system with "numbers";
- the ability of the ABM to maneuver in the final segment of the trajectory.

Moreover, the Soviet Union could earmark measures directed specifically against space elements of the SDI system, for example, wage a preventive strike on these elements, thus depriving the antimissile defense system of the possibility of registering the launches of Soviet ICBM's. Taking into account the level of development of Soviet space technology, the USSR would have the opportunity to place in orbit ahead of time space satellites intended to combat the enemy's space objects. These satellites could be equipped with arms based on kinetic energy. At the same time, elements of the SDI system located in space could be attacked by missiles of the ASAT [antisatellite] type launched both from the earth's surface and from the air.

Thus one can agree with Western experts that from the technical side and with the existing development of Soviet technology, it would be quite possible for the USSR to give an adequate "asymmetric" response to the SDI. But today we have not one monolithic Soviet Union but a number of independent states which, possibly, have different views of this program and do not intend to participate in any "asymmetric" response. But even if we say that these independent states, conducting their joint military-strategic policy, recognize the need for the "asymmetric" version, let us try to look into it a little further.

The development and implementation of such a response would inevitably lead to the buildup for the next round of the arms race, even though it would be "asymmetrical." One can quite clearly assume that the successors to the Soviet Union would lose any interest in significantly reducing strategic offensive weapons, especially heavy ABM's with their detachable warheads. The independent states of the former USSR would be forced to retain, modernize, and improve them, thus providing a reliable potential for nuclear deterrence. It would be more important for these states to have nontraditional

means of delivery of nuclear weapons to their target, such as heavy bombers, the navy, and atomic submarines. This could lead to a breakdown and structural rearrangement of the Soviet nuclear triad they have inherited. It would also be necessary to invest additional funds in the development of long-distance cruise missiles and antisatellite weapons.

As a result, one can say that the "asymmetric" response of the USSR successors to the SDI will contribute to drawing these countries into the "space" round of the arms race, which is encompassing more and more new areas. There is no doubt that this version will introduce elements of confrontation into the relations between the newly formed countries and the United States. Taking into account the pathetic condition of the economy of the heirs to the Soviet Union, the realization of the "asymmetric" response to the strategic defense initiative seems unjustified from the economic standpoint as well.

About nine years have passed since the proclamation of the SDI. During this time deep political transformations have taken place in the world. We shall merely note certain historical events: the agreements between the United States and USSR on elimination of medium- and short-range missiles and reduction of strategic offensive weapons, the treaty on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, the disappearance of the socialist camp, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the coordinated Soviet-American policy during the Persian Gulf War, and, finally, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the formation of a number of independent states on its territory. The relations between these new states and the main rival-partner of the former USSR, the United States, are being built on a new basis which presupposes a rejection of any confrontation and a striving for cooperation. But during these years the world has not become a safer place. At the present time missile technology is no longer a "secret under lock and key," it is widespread throughout the world. According to Western estimates, 15-20 Third World countries could have nuclear weapons by the year 2000. There is the danger that nuclear and missile weapons could be used by dictatorial regimes or fall into the hands of extremist groups and terrorists. The entire world shuddered during August 1991 when it became known that during the coup attempt for 72 hours USSR President M.S. Gorbachev was in complete isolation in Foros and was not in control of the Soviet "nuclear button." After the failure of the putsch, the clearly manifest tendency toward the disintegration of the USSR led to the formation of a number of independent states on whose territory there are nuclear weapons, and there is no political or economic stability in these states yet. Western experts think that under these conditions a random or unsanctioned launching of a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead is possible.

The new political realities also demanded new approaches to the SDI problem on the part of its initiators. Responding to the events taking place in the world and having encountered certain technical difficulties, the

United States shifted from an intention to create an impenetrable "space shield" over its territory for protection from a possible mass Soviet nuclear-missile attack to the development of a limited nonnuclear antimissile defense over the territory of the United States and its allies from ballistic missiles of "unfriendly" countries of the "Third World" or an unsanctioned random launching of an ICBM. Thus the current version of the SDI is not aimed directly against the countries that are successors to the former Soviet Union and, consequently, there is no need to develop strict anti-SDI measures.

Taking into account the principally new political and military-strategic conditions, it seems necessary to reinterpret the previous approach of the former Soviet Union to the SDI problem and reject the previously proclaimed "asymmetric" response. The successors to the USSR can reject the goal of "third" ballistic missiles just as the United States and other countries did. Taking into account the fact that in keeping with the Alma-Ata declaration of 21 December 1991, it is intended to preserve the unified command of military-strategic forces and unified control over nuclear weapons, and for the newly formed states on the territory of the former USSR it is crucial to consider the proposal from President G. Bush of 27 September 1991, made to what was still the Soviet Union, to shift to joint development of nonnuclear antimissile defense systems, which is a practical precondition for a repetition of R. Reagan's offer for the Soviet Union to participate in the development and deployment of the SDI. The support and advancement by the independent states that are successors to the Soviet Union of the counter initiative of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev for the creation of joint warning systems for a nuclear-missile attack with the deployment of elements both on earth and in space could be the first sign of the readiness of the new states to be integrated into the global antinuclear defense system and to participate in other joint defense projects.

Let us try to do a brief analysis of a possible positive reaction from the independent states to this American proposal. (Taking into account the planned high degree of integration in the military strategy area, it would be preferable to have a single response on behalf of the entire community of independent states. Although it would also be possible for each of the countries formed as a result of the disintegration of the USSR to participate individually in SDI work projects.)

And so the independent states of the former Union accept the American proposal and participate in the joint developments, tests, and progress of the strategic defense initiative in order to create a unified ABM system with elements of space basing over the territories of those countries which have expressed an interest in this and have invested funds for the implementation of the program.

In this case it is possible to single out three positive aspects:

- cooperation in the area of the creation of defense systems of the SDI type will strengthen the incipient partnership between the independent states of the former USSR and the United States. These countries will depend on one another not only because of the possibility of mutual destruction but they will also be linked by the work on the joint defense program. National security is assured by means of collaboration and cooperation and not through mutual intimidation and confrontation;
- participation in the development of the global system of protection from ballistic missiles will be a step along the path to integration of the independent states formed on the territory of the USSR into the world economy (at the present time about 50 of the most developed states are participating in the SDI);
- joint work on the cutting edge of science for a common goal presupposes for the heirs to the Soviet Union a removal of the restrictions within the framework of the Cocom [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policies] lists;
- during the process of the research and the work on joint strategic defense new technologies and interesting technical solutions will inevitably appear, which in the future can be used in the civilian sector of the economy;
- division of labor, specialization, and the participation of other countries will significantly reduce expenditures on the creation of the global SDI system;
- the problem of conversion in the countries that are heirs to the USSR will probably become less critical since the former Soviet military-industrial complex will have a chance to use its powerful potential and work on "space" contracts, including American ones, for the SDI;
- relations between the heirs to the Soviet Union and Western countries will reach a new level of cooperation in science, technology, economics, the military sphere, and politics;
- the independent states of the former USSR will no longer have to invest money in modernizing their own ABM defense;
- the Western states will have somewhat less concern about the sovereignization of the former republics of the USSR and the increased danger of the spreading of nuclear weapons through the territory of the newly formed states and also the possibility of their unsanctioned use;
- there will be a hope of a gradual transition to "defensive" concepts which will be accompanied by a constant reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

Of course, in making such a decision the heirs to the Soviet Union will have to recognize that they will no longer be able to hold a leading position both in politics

and in the military-strategic area. Questions of the security of each of the countries formed on the territory of the USSR, above all military, will be most closely linked to the security of other countries, including the United States. Being "on the same team" with the United States in the implementation of the largest defense project, these countries will have to agree in advance to play "secondary" or even "tertiary" roles. The participation of the heirs to the USSR in the joint work on the global antimissile defense system with elements located in space also presupposes a high degree of confidence and an unprecedented level of transparency in relations among nuclear powers. The heirs to the Soviet Union will have to open up to the Americans the doors to their laboratories and scientific research centers where work that is extremely sensitive for defense is going on.

Acceptance of the American proposal will also entail a radical change of the former Soviet position in negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva (YaKV), in keeping with which the Soviet Union proceeded from the idea that there is an objective interconnection between offensive and defensive weapons. This viewpoint presupposes a strict coordination of the agreement on significant reductions of strategic offensive weapons with the existence of the corresponding restrictions on the ABM system. This position of the former USSR was reflected in the 1972 ABM Treaty. The legal heirs to the Soviet Union will have to adopt a conceptually different approach, which the American delegation has insisted on since the very beginning of the negotiations. The basis of this approach is the proposal for a transition on the basis of cooperation to the development of defense against strategic ballistic missiles. In the opinion of the United States, with the appearance of new technologies, the latest achievements in the area of electronics, new materials, and so forth, there arises a real possibility of creating a highly effective nonnuclear ABM system which, in turn, raises the question of the need to revise the concept of the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, on which the ABM Treaty was based. Accepting this tenet, it is logical also to recognize the need to conduct extensive testing work for creating completely unrestricted ABM systems with the placement of their elements in space (which the Americans have been doing for a number of years).

Thus the countries that are heirs to the USSR will have to agree to a termination of the 1972 ABM Treaty or at least a significant revision of it, which would remove existing restrictions on testing and the development of antimissile defense systems.

Ultimately, on the global plane this approach to the ABM Treaty could signal the beginning of the transition in conjunction with the United States to a regime of deterrence with a large reliance on defense. It is this approach that can be seen in the latest version of the SDI—"G-Pals" which was approved by the U.S. Congress in the summer of 1991.

Analyzing the possible decision to include the heirs to the Soviet Union in the global project for creating an ABM system, one can say that the existing tendencies in world politics and the state of affairs within the former USSR are persistently urging the leadership of these countries in the direction of a positive response to the American proposal. On the whole such a positive decision could make it possible to satisfy the national interests of the countries formed on the territory of the USSR in the area of military security with maximum savings of funds and contribute to their integration into the world economy, and it would be a step forward toward the establishment of a new world order based on "purely defensive" concepts and the lowest possible levels of arms.

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New S-300 Missile Said 'Superior' to Patriot

PM0704094792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Viktor Litovkin and Dmitriy Khrupov: "S-300 Better Than Patriot, Our Generals Claim"]

[Text] The Moscow Air Defense District Press Center organized a trip for Moscow journalists to the anti-aircraft missile battalion in the village of Verevskoye, Solnechnogorskiy Rayon, and the air defense division command center in the city of Dolgoprudnyy.

Journalists had a unique opportunity to see the latest S-300 [SA-10] anti-aircraft missile complex, which Moscow generals and colonels described as similar to, but better than, the U.S. Patriot which made a name for itself during the war in the Persian Gulf.

Correspondents were able to watch it go from traveling to deployed position, see a cross section of the actual missile and its components, and attend a brief tactical exercise at the military command and control center of the air defense division that guards the northern sector of Moscow—it involved repelling a massive attack by foreign aircraft.

Afterwards Colonel General of Aviation Anatoliy Kornukov, commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, known to IZVESTIYA readers in connection with the South Korean Boeing-747 affair, answered questions at a news conference.

What information did journalists derive from the visit to the Moscow air defense forces? The information that our S-300 is in many ways superior to the Patriot: It can attack targets as low as 25 meters, while the U.S. missile can only attack targets as low as 60 meters; It moves under its own steam, whereas the Patriot is carried on a trailer; it can hit six targets at once, while the Patriot can hit only three; most important of all, it identifies and hits targets at twice the range and can combat aerial targets

(aircraft, operational-tactical and cruise missiles of all types) from any direction, the Patriot only from a specified direction....

The S-300 costs approximately 5-6 million rubles [R]. Journalists were not told exactly how many of these complexes there are in the Moscow area, but they were told that there were enough to ensure reliable protection of the capital's skies.

What was the reason for publicizing the new complex, revealing the tactical and technical specifications of the S-300, and stressing its advantages? (Incidentally, when it was reasonably suggested by journalists that the weapons should be compared in practice, the generals proposed holding a competition between the anti-aircraft missile complexes, not in a war situation, of course, but at a test site. At ours perhaps, although theirs would hold no fears).

I believe the secret of the "open doors" approach is simple—the air defense people have serious problems—manning problems. Officers are already having to do guard duty. The number of units on alert duty has been halved. There is not enough money to provide amenities. In the Moscow Air Defense District, 2,500 people are without accommodation, more than 1,000 are living in dilapidated housing that was built 40-50 years ago, and 6,000 families who have lost all touch with the Army have to be moved out of closed garrisons....

Difficult problems have now arisen in the Near and Middle East with the influx of U.S. Patriot complexes. Since the scandal over the transfer of a number of key elements of this complex to China, other countries' chances of acquiring this weapon are severely limited. If it is confirmed that the Russian weapon possesses such sterling defense performance qualities, then a number of states that fear aggression will have a real commercial opportunity of obtaining the S-300 anti-aircraft missile complex, which is in no way inferior to the Patriot, but is even superior.

In this case Russia will evidently be a serious competitor in the world arms market.

Skrunda Radar Construction Reportedly to Stop

*LD1204120992 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1300 GMT 9 Apr 92*

[Text] The commander of the Russian Army garrison has announced that the construction of the Skrunda radar has reportedly been discontinued because such an order has been received from Moscow. Soon a gradual dismantling of the construction units will begin which will last for approximately six months. First the constructors will sell the equipment, including tractors, bulldozers, and motor vehicles. We received this information from the LETA agency.

However, our correspondent Silva Bendrate, commenting on this, says that for the time being no kind of

official documents confirming this have been submitted to the Kuldiga rayon self-government.

Moscow Air Defense Readiness Viewed

*MK1004091592 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Apr 92 pp 1-2*

[Pavel Felgengauer report under "Army" rubric: "Moscow Air Defense Ready To Ward Off Attack By As Yet Unknown Enemy. Colonel General of Aviation Anatoliy Kornukov: 'We Are Resolutely Shedding Our Rear Services Mentality'"]

[Text] The Moscow Air Defense System has already been deprived of part of the early warning stations (Ukrainian air defense has ceased sharing information), while the remaining strategically important bases situated in the Baltic region and in Byelarus also may soon "clam up." However, inasmuch as no one is any longer in a position to precisely indicate a possible adversary (NATO? Ukraine?), then the very concept of "early warning bases" becomes somewhat eroded.

But officers serve as they best know how, according to the regulations. As many as 50 percent of all battalions are in alert duty status (at any given moment). Formerly, 100 percent were on alert duty, but now there are insufficient personnel. In the battalion where the accompanying photograph was taken, compulsory service personnel were only 52 percent of strength in February. Now it is somewhat more: 72 percent. But this is the result of a bold experiment. The battalion has enlisted (on a voluntary basis) deserters from the Transcaucas, Ukraine, and other unfriendly places. Officer details are appointed to guard particularly important installations (weapons and munitions dumps).

In recent years the Air Defense Forces have been reequipped with the S-300 mobile solid-fueled surface-to-air missile system. The old liquid-fueled systems which used toxic heptyls have been withdrawn from service almost everywhere. (Including the renowned S-75, which brought down Powers and saw successful service in Vietnam.)

Officers praise the S-300. They maintain "that if we had sent several S-300 regiments to Iraq, there's no knowing how things would have ended up for the Americans." They also claim that the S-300 "is not inferior, and in some respects is even superior, to the celebrated U.S. Patriot system."

It most likely is, although the S-300 has not yet had occasion to demonstrate its high tactical-technical capabilities in combat. However, Israeli experts maintain that the use of Patriot missiles during the Gulf war caused greater losses and destruction in Israel than if those missiles had not been there at all. (Soviet [as published] air defense officers get irritated by arguments about the "harm caused by using anti-air complexes"), even if the topic is U.S. systems.

The Patriot system is one of the first fully computerized weapons systems which can function autonomously in combat, without human intervention. People are only required for servicing and adjustment purposes. This is why it is so expensive and unreliable. But it looks as though such weapons are the weapons of the future. Whereas the Russian Army will be forced to remain for a long time in the past, where combat capability is attainable, but primarily by utilizing people rather than computers.

The S-300 is significantly bigger and heavier than the Patriot, primarily because the control unit is manufactured from Soviet parts, and as a result it occupies 75 percent of the missile's useful capacity (a ratio of 3:1 with the explosive ordnance). Accordingly, loading the new missiles into the launchers requires considerable effort and time and is not entirely free of danger. Both the battalion and division command posts lack modern computer terminal displays. In their place are electron beam receivers. The operators are therefore obliged to work for many hours in virtual darkness. (Aside from anything else, it becomes quite oppressive in the control bunker because of this.)

At the division [divizionnyy] command point personnel have to remain on duty for seven hours under the constant din of the autonomous power plant. And it is crowded. Almost the entire area is occupied by a huge third-generation computer. But, in return, it is cheap. One S-300 missile complex (12 mobile launchers each armed with four missiles, a mobile command post, radars, and so on) cost 1.5 million rubles in 1991. (A single Patriot missile costs around \$1 million.) Prices have risen since then, but the market rate of the dollar has also risen. Therefore, the S-300 system really has some considerable export potential, particularly in the Third World.

Meanwhile, the Moscow Air Defense District's 30 S-300 regiments, along with its fighter-interceptors, are ready to repulse an attack by several thousand foreign aircraft and cruise missiles irrespective of their point of origin. And if any successor to Mathias Rust again tries to organize a purge of the Armed Forces leadership, he too will get his just deserts. A Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy machine gun has been installed for this purpose at each air defense regiment's visual observation post...

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA'S questions concerning the prospects for the air defense system were answered by Gen. Anatoliy Kornukov, commander of the Moscow Air Defense District.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] Is what you have shown us—which is not very modern Soviet technology—all you have?

[Kornukov] Unfortunately yes, but this year we already have received new improved models, including new computers (10 units). We have placed them in the most crucial sectors—in the perimeter corps [vneshniye korpusa] and at the district's command post. Generally

speaking, the Baykal system fully meets modern conditions and enables us to monitor the airspace.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] In the event of a strike by air traffic controllers will you be able to ensure air traffic movement?

[Kornukov] Yes, we already have carried out preparatory work and have been ready on call. We can provide for the main sectors, St. Petersburg and Moscow.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

WGF Plans To Scrap Equipment in Germany

PM0204131592 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Mar 92 p 2

[Colonel V. Markushin report: "Wuensdorf Willing To Dismantle Armor, Petitioning Bonn To Do This"]

[Text] The Western Group of Forces [WGF] command recently raised with the German side the question of the need to dismantle some armored equipment (infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers) without its being withdrawn to Russia. Not, of course, out of a desire to experiment. The Western Group of Forces has roughly 2,300 pieces of outdated equipment which there is no point in lugging home—that is unprofitable. If it is dismantled on site, that is, turned into scrap, not only is it possible to avoid the burden of unnecessary expenditure on transportation, but also to earn some money by selling a secondary raw material that firms need. And there are such firms. Moreover, they offer a good price for scrap metal.

The money will once again be used to cover the costs of withdrawing hardware and material resources which have proved so high that the 1 billion Deutsche marks [DM] allocated by the Germans has proved insufficient. This was clear from the results of the first year of the troop withdrawal.

People in Bonn are saying that the treaty on terms for withdrawal does not say anything about the question of dismantling equipment on East German territory. Right, the response comes from Wuensdorf, it does not, but we are raising it now since we are counting on you to understand the situation that has developed. Ultimately we are concerned about meeting the withdrawal schedule in a timely manner. In addition it is a question of hardware that can now be destroyed under the conventional arms treaty—according to all the regulations, in the presence of foreign observers.

Where can the dismantling of the hardware be organized? Has technology been perfected? How does it conform to German environmental norms?

These are legitimate questions. But there are exhaustive answers to them. German television reporters were provided with answers at the base that has been set up next to the Western Group of Forces staff to dismantle the

armored equipment. There was a vast enterprise here earlier, repairing armored equipment. The base has two brigades with 100 specialists each. They have prepared two parallel production lines to dismantle infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. You can have eight vehicles on line at once and dismantle three to five units a day.

We went round the workshop escorted by Base Chief Colonel V. Trofimov, who provided explanations. The key technological elements are two vast purification chambers the size of a four-story building. The equipment is carefully washed there using a special cleansing agent, sileron. A parallel structure—a neutralization tank—turns the finished liquid into pure water. Personnel here claim that it is drinkable. The bodies are broken up using acetylene and oxygen. One set of canisters is enough for four vehicles. The cost is DM25-30. At a price of DM70 per tonne of scrap metal the game is worth the candle.

The dismantling workshop is fitted with a powerful air-purification filter system. So, from that angle too, the environment is securely protected.

Conditions for foreign observers' work and recreation have been created at the base. By and large, from all viewpoints, the Wuensdorf enterprise is ready for work.

Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, thinks that experts should be expected to appear in the near future; they will evidently examine everything and present the Bonn leadership with their findings. But the politicians have the last word. We would like there to be no artificial obstacles put up in this case.

Russia Wants Troops in Estonia Until Year 2000

Prime Minister Cited

PM3103143092 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 30 Mar 92 p A6

[Report on undated Tallinn interview with Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi by Mert Kubu]

[Excerpt] Tallinn—Russia wants the former Soviet Union's troops to remain in Estonia until the year 2000.

This is apparent from a proposal from the Russian government, Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi, 50, revealed in an interview with DAGENS NYHETER on the eve of his official visit to Sweden that begins tomorrow, Tuesday [31 March].

The Estonian government immediately rejected the proposal and demanded that the troops leave the country by the end of the year at the latest.

The Russian proposal came in the form of an official letter which was handed over by the Russian Embassy in Tallinn. The proposal is that the two sides appoint

international observers to check on the withdrawal of CIS troops from Estonia in the years leading up to the year 2000.

"From this we can draw the conclusion that they want to stay right up to the year 2000 and that is something that we will not accept under any circumstances," Vahi said.

The only good news so far is that the number of former Soviet soldiers and officers in Estonia has decreased from 50,000 to around 25,000, but now things are moving more sluggishly.

What worries the government in particular is the reactor at the Paldiski military base. It is known that it is leaking.

"We have asked NATO for help in transporting it out of the country and ensuring that it is transferred to Russia. I have spoken with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner about the problem and he has promised to look into the possibility of helping us."

[Kubu] Are there nuclear arms on Estonian territory?

"I have no proof that this is the case, but some reports and clues indicate that this could be the case. On the other hand we do know that there are chemical weapons here. Everything must be taken out of the country." [passage omitted]

Russian Commander on Withdrawal Problems

LD0804091992 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 0900 GMT 2 Apr 92

[Text] Vice Admiral Yuriy Belov, commander of the Tallinn garrison of Russian Armed Forces, said in an interview given to RIA that the biggest problem for the upcoming Estonian-Russian talks will be deadlines for the troop withdrawal. According to Yuriy Belov, the issue of troop withdrawal became even more acute after the Republic of Estonia's Supreme Council deemed all property, hardware, and conventional weapons of the Russian Army stationed in Estonia to be the property of the Estonian state.

Yuriy Belov also noted that during the troop withdrawal talks the provision of registration in the Republic of Estonia for retired Russian servicemen might become another obstacle, the Baltic News Service reports.

Further on CIS Troop Withdrawal From Lithuania

Official: Russian Presence 'Intolerable'

OW0104190592 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1818 GMT 1 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "The uncontrolled presence of the Russian army in the Baltic nations and the refusal of the Russian government to commit to a schedule for withdrawal of

the forces is intolerable", the Minister of the Regional Guard Audrius Butkevicius said in Berlin Tuesday [31 March].

Butkevicius said criminal elements are taking advantage of the situation and buying weapons from the soldiers. The Minister of the Regional Guard expressed the concern that the army of the former USSR will become "an independent political force".

Troops Transfer to Russian Jurisdiction Welcomed

*PM0604111392 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Apr 92 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Lithuanian Leadership Views Positively Transfer of CIS Border Troops to Russian Jurisdiction"]

[Text] Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, has sent a telegram to Russian Federation Vice Premier Sergey Shakhrai. In the telegram he points out that the presence of military subunits of the former Soviet Union on the Lithuanian Republic's border and the refusal to transfer border points to the Lithuanian Republic's territorial protection services contravene the Russian Federation's commitments to respect Lithuania's sovereignty and laws. Therefore, the republic's leadership view positively Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Decree on the transfer of the border troops to Russian jurisdiction.

Discussions With France

*LD0704111492 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT
2 Apr 92*

[Text] Problems of the withdrawal of the Soviet Army and the control of Lithuania's borders were discussed today by Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Ceslovas Stankevicius, French Ambassador in Lithuania Philippe de Suremain, and Embassy Military Attache Christian [name indistinct].

According to Ceslovas Stankevicius, this conversation demonstrated that France is interested in these problems. Lithuania expects France's political and [words indistinct] assistance, Stankevicius said.

Silute Antiaircraft Unit Withdraws

*LD0804125192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 4 Apr 92*

[Text] Correspondent Antanas Lauraitis reports from Silute that today is a special day for Silute rayon. The gates of the missile base at the Jonaiciai district near (?Liekniai), which has existed here for several decades, are already open. Engines of a column of powerful motor vehicles are working noisily.

The Ministry of Defense commandant of the Silute rayon, Jonas Purlys, reported that 32 surface-to-air missiles have already left for Kaliningrad Oblast. Now other equipment is being taken away.

Soldiers of the occupation Army are, of course, leaving Lithuania without enthusiasm. But this does not concern Silute or the whole of Lithuania. The heads of the rayon and district are today concerned about how to take over the territory of the military unit as soon as possible. It is true, missiles and other equipment left, but it is not clear when and how this huge and devastated forest territory will be handed over to its true owners.

By the way, I can report that the equipment, ammunition, soldiers, and officers have left a military unit situated near Pagegiai. Commandant Jonas Purlys also reported that soldiers and officers and their equipment have left a missile site near Vilkyciai.

Shakray on Withdrawal Talks

*LD0804094992 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
2130 GMT 6 Apr 92*

[Text] In his interview to the Lithuanian News Agency ELTA, Sergey Shakray, who had recently resigned from the post of Russian deputy prime minister, confirmed that he continued to head the Russian negotiations delegation with Lithuania. Mr Shakray said that he expected the Russian and Lithuanian teams to meet following the Russian People's Deputies Congress which would most probably end within 10 days. Sergey Shakray refused to comment on the position of the Russian delegation at the forthcoming meeting and added that he would have to consult with the top command of the CIS Armed Forces. The Lithuanian and Russian negotiation teams on the Army withdrawal have met only once in January of this year and the Lithuanian side accuses Russia of not abiding by the January agreement.

Foreign Minister Comments

*LD0804082592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
2130 GMT 7 Apr 92*

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Algirdas Saudargas assessed Latvia's and Estonia's latest statements to the effect that they will not sign the final documents of the Helsinki Conference if Russia makes no concrete commitment to withdraw the troops up to then [spring], as further putting emphasis on the current stand of the Baltic States, which is in principle invariable. Signing or not signing should not be debated before the documents are ready, Algirdas Saudargas said, emphasizing the need to discuss the efforts aimed at adopting Helsinki documents favorable for the Baltic states and thus linking the negotiations with the Helsinki process. When asked about whether Lithuania could not orient itself at a more compromising withdrawal term of say two years in the talks with Russia, Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas said that being a member of the negotiating delegation he was not authorized to discuss such a possibility. The

minister pointed out that Lithuania's lawful demands to pull out all the troops shortly involved no technical difficulties and could be fulfilled. In the Minister's opinion, the reasons for the procrastinations are political since social issues are secondary and can be discussed when the withdrawal terms are known. Social problems are not caused by the withdrawal; they existed and will exist, Algirdas Saudargas said, adding that it was his personal assessment.

Agreement Signed on CSFR Troop Withdrawal

*LD0104201392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1943 GMT 1 Apr 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow, April 1 TASS—General-Colonel Pavel Grachev, first deputy-commander of the CIS United Armed Forces, and Josef Vavroushek, minister of the Czechoslovak Federal Committee on the Environment, signed an agreement on Wednesday [1 April] on property and financial issues concerning the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory.

The document provides for the settlement of bilateral claims such as compensation for immobile Soviet property—on the part of Czechoslovakia, and Russian financing of programmes to mitigate damage to the environment.

The immobile property of the Soviet military will belong to Czechoslovakia, the document says. Assets obtained from sales by the Czechoslovak Government will go towards reviving of the environment in the former Soviet military areas, and building homes in Russia for soldiers and officers withdrawn from Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government will allocate 300 million korunas this year for the said purposes.

The agreement is advantageous for both sides and may serve as an example for other Eastern European countries that hosted Soviet troops to solve similar problems, experts from the Russian Ministry on External Economic Affairs said. Czechoslovakia is the only country with which Russia has settled this dispute.

Baltic Delegations Discuss CIS Troop Withdrawal

Exchange Information on Talks With Russia

*OW0404184192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1730 GMT 4 Apr 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The government delegations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia at the negotiations with Russia have had a meeting in Vilnius today at which they discussed the withdrawal of the troops of the former USSR from the territory of their states.

The delegation leaders have told the press that the delegations exchanged information on the progress of

their negotiations with the Russian delegations and expressed concern over delays in the withdrawal of troops and in the reaching of agreements on the issue.

The leader of the Lithuanian delegation, Ceslovas Stankevicius, was satisfied with the meeting, which he described as a working one so that the delegations had planned to take no decisions during it. He said this was a good opportunity to discuss the withdrawal of troops in detail and the positions held by the delegations at the negotiations. Stankevicius said he had noticed no essential differences in these positions.

However BF [BALTFAX] has found out from sources close to the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry that there are some differences. Thus Latvia and Estonia refuse to sign Helsinki 2 agreements unless at the negotiations Russia states its willingness to withdraw the troops and specific dates for this are agreed on. Lithuania, on the other hand, intends to internationalise the issue and bring it up in Helsinki.

Stankevicius said Lithuania was going to organise a meeting with an authorised Russian delegation in order to formulate a concrete and unambiguous meaning for the term "complete and definitive withdrawal of the troops". Such a meeting might take place in April.

Janis Dinevics said there would shortly be a meeting between the official Latvian and Russian delegations.

Joint Communiqué Issued

*LD0404154292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1530 GMT 4 Apr 92*

[Text] Moscow April 4 ITAR-TASS—The complete withdrawal of the former Soviet Union' armed forces, now under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, and related problems were discussed at a meeting in Vilnius today between members of state delegations from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, which are going to have talks with the Russian Federation.

A joint communiqué, issued after the meeting expressed "particular concern on the real process of the withdrawal of troops, illegally deployed on the territory of Baltic states, which is being delayed".

Later at a briefing, the head of the Lithuanian delegation, vice-chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania, Ceslovas Stankevicius, in his statement for the press regreted that "the real process of the troop withdrawal has not begun so far".

Lithuanian Delegate Interviewed

*LD0804130392 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 4 Apr 92*

[Text] A working meeting of the state delegations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on the withdrawal from the territories of the Baltic states of troops which are under the jurisdiction of Russia has met.

We asked the head of the Lithuanian delegation, Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, to comment on the progress of the meeting.

[Begin recording] [Stankevicius] A businesslike discussion on the withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Union from the territories of our states. We are discussing various aspects of this problem.

[Announcer] On the whole, one can say that the ice has moved to some extent, two or three sub-units have left the territory of Lithuania, but this is very insignificant.

[Stankevicius] No, ice has not moved. I have spoken about it more than once, the withdrawal has not started, really. Nothing has changed.

[Announcer] And what is the attitude of the other side, of Russia?

[Stankevicius] One should ask that side. Unfortunately, it simply does not give answers to any vital question.

[Announcer] Why, in your opinion, is Russia's attitude such? You are the head of the state delegation on the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Lithuania. Are there any solutions, mutual understanding?

[Stankevicius] The Army does not fulfill its obligations to the Russian Government. It is allowed to do this, unfortunately.

[Announcer] Thus it does not fulfill the orders of its government?

[Stankevicius] I do not know whether it has any orders. [passage indistinct]

[Announcer] Nevertheless, you are smiling. Is there some optimism present?

[Stankevicius] So far I have no grounds to be optimistic. But I think that it is unavoidable—the withdrawal must start, take place in an active manner, and be completed soon. [end recording]

Delegations 'Express Concern'

LD0804140392 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT
4 Apr 92

[Excerpts] The Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian delegations for negotiations with Russia have expressed their concern over the fact that withdrawal of the former Soviet Army from the Baltic States has not been started. [passage omitted]

This was the first meeting of this kind between the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian negotiation delegations, which was headed by Lithuanian Deputy Parliament Chairman Ceslovas Stankevicius, and the Latvian and Estonian state ministers, Janis Dinevics and (Uno Vehringa).

During the consultations, the states heard each other's information concerning the status of negotiations with Russia regarding Army withdrawal and coordinated joint state positions. Following the meeting, the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian delegation heads presented their statements to the press in which they noted, inter alia, that such meetings should be held regularly.

The problems encountered by the negotiation delegations of all three states are similar. Therefore, at today's meeting there were no basic differences in the positions of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

It was announced following the meeting that the Baltic States will employ all diplomatic means and will seek intensive negotiations with Russia.

Ceslovas Stankevicius was unable to say when the second meeting of the Lithuanian and Russian delegations would take place. According to him, Lithuania proposed holding a meeting back in March; however, this was not accepted by the Russian side.

Meanwhile, Russian representatives have recently informed the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow of the possibility of holding such a meeting in April.

Moldova Receives Vienna Disarmament Delegation

AU0704131692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1121 GMT 7 Apr 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 7/4/1992—The speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Alexandru Mosanu, received a delegation of experts from the Vienna Committee on Disarmament Regarding Conventional Weapons headed by Ambassador Lynn Hansen, reports MOLDOVA-PRES.

During the interview, Mr. Mosanu surveyed the situation in the republic, which has worsened owing to the actions taken by the pro-imperial forces on the left bank of the Dniester. The conflict, he said, has no interethnic character, it is of a political and ideological nature. The separatists' ideal is to re-establish the former Soviet empire.

Chief delegate Lynn Hansen stressed that the Vienna Committee paid special attention to the political, economic and ecologic problems that jeopardize international peace and security. One of the committee's concerns is also to prevent conflicts, he underlined. After the disintegration of the USSR, a state signatory to the documents on European security, the danger has emerged that the weapons in the territories of the sovereign republics can come out of control. That is why the participation of the Republic of Moldova and of other CIS states in the Vienna Committee's activity would be welcomed, Mr. Lynn Hansen pointed out.

Presidential Adviser Claims Moldova 'Disarmed'*AU0804201092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1740 GMT 8 Apr 92*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 8/4/1992—"By liquidating the former Soviet Army's arsenals in the territory of Moldova, the CIS Unified Armed Forces command has virtually disarmed the Republic"—the military adviser to the Moldovan President, Nicolae Chirtoaca, said in an interview with the [Moldovan] newspaper CURIERUL DE SEARA, quoted by MOLDOVA-PRES.

In the adviser's opinion, under the Paris disarmament accord, Moldova should have 250-271 tanks, 400-500 armored carriers, hundreds of artillery systems, and battle helicopters.

Nicolae Chirtoaca says that part of the former Soviet Army's combat weapons should remain in the republic, because the Army was formed also with the Moldova's contribution, the press agency says. He said he hoped that part of the military equipment would remain in place.

Talks on Troop Withdrawal From Poland End*LD1404211692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2022 GMT 14 Apr 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valentin Volkov]

[Text] Warsaw, April 14 TASS—Talks on property and financial aspects of the forthcoming withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland ended today in Warsaw. The Russian delegation was headed by the First Deputy Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, and the Polish by the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Jerzy Makarczyk.

A detailed exchange of views took place on a probable mutually acceptable solution to these problems. A close understanding of each other's stand on a number of aspects emerged during the talks. Both sides worked out accords, which will be put for consideration before the leaderships of the two countries.

NUCLEAR TESTING**Archangel Rally Protests Novaya Zemlya Use***LD0504005592 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 29 Mar 92*

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A rally by opponents of the Russian president's decree on Novaya Zemlya was held today outside the town soviet in Archangel. This legislative act envisages the possibility of resumption of nuclear tests on the Novaya Zemlya test ground and taking the territory of the Arctic archipelago into federal hands. The local authorities cannot agree to the territory of the oblast being reduced by more than 82,000 sq km at the stroke of a pen and without their leave. Archangel Oblast is ready

to defend its rights to ownership of the territory of the islands, even in the Russian Constitutional Court.

Norway Urges Non-Resumption of Nuclear Testing*LD0504202692 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1926 GMT 2 Apr 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Loskutov]

[Excerpt] Oslo, 2 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—Norway has called on Russia to refrain from renewing tests of nuclear weapons in Novaya Zemlya. This appeal is contained in a letter which Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg sent today to his Russian colleague Andrey Kozyrev. The Norwegian Government, the letter notes, is increasingly concerned at reports that the Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin is examining the question of renewing nuclear explosions in the north. Norway is particularly concerned by the danger for people's health and the environment which the nuclear weapon testing entails. [passage omitted: Norway last week protested to U.S. over nuclear tests]

Problems of Banning Nuclear Tests Cited*LD0604222992 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1110 GMT 6 Apr 92*

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] On 7 April it will be six months since Moscow unilaterally introduced a one-year moratorium on nuclear tests. But actually the moratorium lasts longer. The last nuclear explosion was staged on 24 October 1990 on the archipelago Novaya Zemlya. By the way, it was the only nuclear test that year. Since then, nuclear testing grounds on the former Soviet Union kept silent. A major part of them near Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, seems to have been closed forever. The only testing ground that remains is on Novaya Zemlya. All in all 132 nuclear explosions have been staged there, which caused great damage to the environment.

Local authorities and public at large demand the testing ground to be closed. The Scandinavian countries also fear Russia may resume tests when the term of the moratorium expires. Sweden and Norway requested Russia to refrain from doing so.

Public concern in the neighboring countries is understandable. But unfortunately Russian authorities have to keep in mind security considerations and Moscow hoped that other countries would join the moratorium but that these hopes haven't been justified [as heard].

Washington officials say that the American program of nuclear tests hasn't been changed notwithstanding the planned cuts in nuclear weapons and their production.

Last year eight underground nuclear tests were conducted on the Nevada testing ground. This year on 26 March the tests resumed in the presence of Russian observers.

So what does Russia have to do then? The Russian military and nuclear experts bring powerful measures to bear on the government. Like their American colleagues, they believe that till nuclear weapons are preserved their tests must be continued though the United States and Russia are no longer potential enemies [as heard]. This is necessary for checking reliability of stockpiled weapons and improving their characteristics. The Russian president, Yeltsin, and the government have to return to this problem very often.

It's possible to guess the decision the Russian authorities will take then. One thing is certain—Moscow remains prepared at any moment to start talks on a complete ban of nuclear tests and do so on a reciprocal basis. [Words indistinct] says it may initially negotiate substantial reductions on such tests. No doubt Moscow will support any moves of other nuclear states to this end.

Underground Tests Effect Yakut Lifespans

OW0704173092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1525 GMT 7 Apr 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The head of the administration of the Upper Vilyusk region of Yakutia Chomchoev said that nine underground nuclear explosions were conducted in the interests of the industrial firm "Yakutalmaz". The explosions emitted radioactivity of up to 500 x-rays an hour into the atmosphere.

The head of the administration said the consequences of the explosions have effected the lifespan of the population of the area, which for men is 47 years, for women 56 years. Ten children were born with birth defects in the region in 1991.

Russia Welcomes French Suspension of Testing

LD0904170192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1537 GMT 9 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Boris Krivoshey, Sergey Nikishov and Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 9 TASS—The Russian leadership received with satisfaction the French decision to suspend nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll, a Foreign Ministry spokesman told a briefing here on Thursday [9 April].

Sergey Yastrzhembskiy replied to an ITAR-TASS question that "we can only welcome such a decision because on many occasions in the past we urged all states, members of the 'nuclear club', to follow our example".

Speaking about the concern of Russia's northern neighbours about the possible renewal of nuclear explosions in

the north, he said that "the moratorium, introduced by the Russian Federation on nuclear tests, is still in force". Consequently, Russia's appeal to countries, including the United States, to terminate all nuclear tests still holds.

Unfortunately, some of our partners make no steps to meet us halfway," Yastrzhembskiy said.

Nuclear Test Moratorium Appeal Adopted

Russian Congress Resolution

LD1004152192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1427 GMT 10 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Apr—The Russian Federation's Sixth Congress of People's Deputies, which is being held at the Kremlin, has appealed to the parliaments of Great Britain, the PRC, and the United States to join the moratorium on nuclear tests declared by the Russian Federation and the Republic of France.

In a special statement adopted today the congress welcomes France joining the moratorium on nuclear tests declared by Russia until 1992.

Foreign Response Viewed

LD1304182192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 13 Apr 92

[Aleksandr Pogodin Commentary]

[Text] The Congress of People's Deputies, the full parliament of Russia, has appealed to the parliaments of Britain, China and the United States to establish a moratorium on nuclear tests already announced by Russia and France. An analysis from our commentator, Aleksandr Pogodin:

This call confirms at the same time the line chosen by the former Soviet Union and continued by its successor Russia, as well as by the practical, positive response to the decisions by French President Francois Mitterrand to suspend the nuclear tests in the Pacific.

I will not enumerate the great many initiatives of Moscow in this area—its appeals to the other nuclear powers to come to terms on a general approach to this highly important problem. It's only notable that last October President Yeltsin announced a one-year moratorium on nuclear explosions. Actually there have been no tests on the territory of the former USSR for 18 months. China's nuclear proving grounds have been silent for about the same period.

And now France has become the first Western nuclear power among those that have been one in ignoring Moscow's calls to announce its own moratorium on

nuclear tests. President Mitterrand has urged the leaderships of the other nuclear powers to complete shortly the talks on strategic arms and offer to interrupt nuclear tests together.

The reaction of Washington and London has been quite restrained. For one the U.S. State Department has noted the important role of the nuclear forces in ensuring the nation's security and expressed the intention to keep testing nuclear weapons as much as is needed.

There are not only political motives for such a stand. There are well-known arguments by the military and by experts on nuclear technology who claim that explosions are simply essential to maintain the weapons of deterrence in a state of reliability and alert. Notably such arguments are given in Russia often too and so one can assume that the political decisions taken in Moscow on this matter were not quite easy at all.

Accordingly it won't be simple by far either to work out a common approach to the problems of a nuclear moratorium by all the nuclear powers. For any accords can be reached only on the basis of principles of equal security, ruling out the possibility for some powers to get advantage and cause damage to the interests of others.

Nonetheless, the search for such solutions can and must be continued. Russia on its part is ready to contribute to resolving this problem of paramount importance.

Arms Tests Resumption Said Contingent on U.S.

*LD1304144192 Hamburg DPA in German
1345 GMT 13 Apr 92*

[Text] Frankfurt/Main (DPA)—According to the international organization International Physicians for the Prevention of a Nuclear War, Russia will begin nuclear weapons testing again in October if the United States has not stopped its tests by then. Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on 27 February, according to which the closed nuclear test site in Novaya Zemlya is to be prepared for new tests. Professor Ulrich Gottstein, the vice president of the organization in Europe, said in Frankfurt on Monday [13 April] after his return from a trip to a number of CIS states.

Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov pointed out that 1 million people live off the nuclear business, 150,000 of them in weapons development and production, he said. It would take at least \$20 billion and 15 years to dismantle and render harmless all nuclear weapons. Nor were there any ideas on how the areas contaminated by nuclear tests could be decontaminated.

Semipalatinsk Site To Be Research Facility

*LD1304195492 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0615 GMT 13 Apr 92*

[By KAZTAG correspondent V. Ganzha for TASS]

[Summary] Alma-Ata, 13 Apr—By a decree of Kazakhstan's president, Semipalatinsk nuclear test site will become a center for peaceful, scientific research. Galleries where underground blasts were carried out may be used for the "utilization of industrial and other waste which is injurious to human health" and destruction of solid-fuel missiles. Ultra-hard substances—even diamonds and sapphires—will be produced using conventional explosives and solid-fuel missile engines. Land subjected to radioactive effects will be recultivated and adjacent areas declared ecological disaster zones.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Further Discussion of Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Policy

Premier Meets With American Delegation

*LD0204182492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1724 GMT 2 Apr 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksandr Litvinov]

[Excerpt] Kiev April 2 TASS—The Prime Minister of Ukraine, Vitold Fokin, is meeting today in Kiev with the recently arrived American delegation and discussing with it the creation of a special scientific centre and a factory for missile destruction. Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk said in a meeting with his representatives in provinces, who supported return to Ukraine of nuclear filling of strategic weapons after their "dismemberment" in Russia. According to them, this filling could be used as nuclear fuel in atomic reactors. [passage omitted]

Moscow Commentary on Ukrainian Stance

*LD0904091592 Moscow Radio Moscow in Czech
1700 GMT 4 Apr 92*

[Commentary by station military observer Vadim Solovyev; Solovyev in Russian fading into Czech report]

[Text] Statements made by some members of the Ukrainian parliament to the effect that a section of nuclear arms should remain in the republic have caused certain concern in European countries. Is this at all possible? Listen to what Vadim Solovyev, our military observer, has to say in reply to this question.

[Solovyev] The nuclear arms issue was clarified quite simply at the beginning of the establishment of the CIS. The establishment of the Commonwealth must not lead to the proliferation of nuclear powers in the world. Leading representatives of the states on which nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union remain agreed that Russia would inherit all nuclear weapons and the nuclear button in the interest of all, and after an agreement with the whole Commonwealth. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan pledged themselves to accede to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, to ratify the treaty

on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1991, and to hand the treaty over to the archives of the Russian parliament. It was agreed that the Commonwealth countries would jointly supervise the withdrawal of nuclear weapons to Russia and their liquidation.

These are merely some provisions of the agreement concerning the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union which was signed by leading representatives of the CIS at the meeting in Alma-Ata last December. In addition, the legislative bodies of Ukraine and Belarus declared the territory of their respective states nuclear-free and forbade for ever any deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories.

Yes, this is how it really is, our military observer continues. All of a sudden ideas have however appeared that Ukraine would gain much more if it stayed a nuclear power. The reason? Its international authority would increase and Russia would have to assess its relation with it differently. As a member of the military I doubt that it is possible to talk seriously about the existence of a nuclear potential in Ukraine. It is true, there are missiles there. What is however also necessary is command points, nuclear weapons guiding system, control of their activity, manufacture and servicing, training the relevant military cadres, and training scientists and engineers—all this is a very heavy financial burden. Only an industrially advanced state, and indeed not everyone, can manage this. The maintenance of nuclear weapons will simply destroy the unbalanced Ukrainian economy.

I however believe that the main reason lies somewhere else—in acquiring and possibly earning revenue with the help of nuclear fission material contained in nuclear warheads. Listen to what General Sergey Zelentsov, deputy commander of the Chief Directorate of the CIS Armed Forces Command, has to say:

[Zelentsov in Russian fading into Czech report] Ukraine, in line with its obligation, must maintain uranium and plutonium [sentence as heard]. Trading with military-grade uranium and plutonium also must not be undertaken. International restrictions exist for states possessing nuclear arms. It is also inadmissible to sell military-grade nuclear materials to states which do not possess such kinds of weapons. Our units which possess nuclear arms refused to take the Ukrainian oath. Ukraine does not possess its own nuclear arms and has no access to them. Nuclear weapons are at present in units subordinated to the central power. We do not intend at all to transfer them to Ukraine. Perhaps we shall have to take extreme measures, but Ukraine will not get nuclear arms, says General Sergey Zelentsov, a representative of the CIS Armed Forces Command.

[Solovyev] Now the latest news on this subject, Vadim Solovyev, our military observer, continues. At a meeting in Brussels this week with the U.S. secretary of defense, Colonel General Pavel Grachev, Russia's first deputy minister of defense, assured him that all tactical weapons

deployed on the territory of the former Soviet republics will be transferred to Russia by 1 July this year. This process will take place under the joint supervision of the CIS countries. The arms withdrawn will be liquidated, but before that they will be gathered at special bases in Russia. Changes in the timetable of the withdrawal of strategic nuclear devices and their concentration on the territory of Russia is also not envisaged. It will be completed in 1994 on the basis of the decision signed by leading representatives of CIS countries.

IPPNW Chief Comments

LD1004083192 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First
Program Network in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 7 Apr 92

[Excerpts] A delegation from the Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War [IPPNW] organization visited all the countries of the CIS that have nuclear weapons. [passage omitted] On 6 April, the delegation had a conversation with Volodymyr Hrynyov, deputy chairman of the parliament. Professor Bernard Lown, head of the delegation, presented the program worked out by his organization, which is directed at the total destruction of all nuclear weapons.

[Begin Lown recording in English fading to Ukrainian] As far as we know, the Ukrainian Government treats this problem very seriously and considers it necessary to get totally rid of (?nuclear) weapons, says Professor Lown. However, we do not see quite clearly the position of Ukraine on certain questions. For example, who controls the 27,000 nuclear warheads stationed on the territory of Ukraine? When we were in Moscow, continued Professor Lown, Gennadiy Burbulis told us that the only state who controls the nuclear weapons on the territory of the former USSR is Russia, which acts as a legal successor to the USSR in that sphere. We are also concerned, continues Professor Lown, by how the process of the destruction of the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine is going. [end recording]

The nuclear-free status of Ukraine has already been declared in the most important documents which assert Ukraine's sovereignty, replied Volodymyr Hrynyov, deputy head of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

[Begin Hrynyov recording in Russian] There is no doubt about the nuclear-free status of Ukraine being included in our new constitution. It is a position of the principle of Ukraine today, and it will not, it seems to me, undergo any changes in the foreseeable future. I would be wrong if I did not indicate those difficulties which we come across in reality on the path to a nuclear-free status. [passage omitted] Ukraine will not just try to implement the idea of its nuclear-free status but, I think, it will also not break the framework of removing the nuclear weapons from its territory. The question of control over nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine is very important and serious now. What Gennadiy Burbulis said is not quite right. Indeed, Ukraine does not have the possibility to use nuclear weapons on its territory. But at the same time, Ukraine has the right of veto on the use of

these weapons. And the last thing. It is to do with the testing of nuclear weapons. We believe that nuclear weapons should not be perfected further. Its current technical condition is quite enough for beginning the process of total nuclear disarmament. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Supreme Soviet Resolution

LD0904183292 Kiev UKRINFORM Diplomatic Information Service in Russian 1723 GMT 9 Apr 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksandr Litvinov]

[Text] Kiev, 9 Apr—Ukraine has confirmed its intention to join the 1968 Agreement on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, says the resolution adopted today by the Supreme Soviet of the republic.

However, bearing in mind that the Russian Government and the command of the CIS strategic forces have not created the system of implementing effective technical control over nonuse of the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine which (the system) was envisaged by the agreement of 21 December 1991 and also taking into consideration Ukraine's high responsibility over the destruction and nonuse of components of nuclear warheads and the ban on their export, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has resolved to consider inexpedient the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine until the mechanism for international control over its destruction with Ukraine's participation has been developed and implemented.

The Cabinet of Ministers has been instructed to take corresponding measures immediately to provide effective technical control on the part of Ukraine over nonuse of the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. It has been recommended to the president of Ukraine to start negotiations with leaders of the nuclear states regarding the complex solving of problems to do with the liquidation of nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry must take measures to re-man the strategic forces, stationed on the territory of Ukraine, with servicemen from the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Defense Minister on Withdrawal

LD1404021992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0050 GMT 14 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Lebedev]

[Text] Washington, 14 April (ITAR-TASS)—Ukraine Defense Minister Col. Gen. Konstantin Morozov, who is on an official visit to Washington, was received yesterday in the Pentagon by U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. As the Pentagon representatives have reported, this is Cheney's first such meeting with a minister of defense "of any of the former Soviet republics."

Answering journalists' questions after his conversation with Cheney, which lasted more than three hours, the

head of the Ukraine military department described the meeting as "very important." As expected, the main focus was on the question of withdrawal of the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from Ukraine territory. In the past few days the U.S. Administration has repeatedly warned the leadership of the republic about the necessity for the rapid withdrawal of weapons of mass destruction from its territory.

"The halt in the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine was temporary and we are now discussing how to carry out further withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons from there," stated Morozov. He has expressed hope that this problem will be solved soon and has assured that Ukraine "will fulfill all its obligations in this area."

The minister did not specify by what date Ukraine intends to complete the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons in its possession to Russia. Morozov stressed that weapons "are not to be simply handed over by one state to the other." In his opinion, it is necessary to create an international system of control over their dismantling and destruction.

Touching upon the question of tactical nuclear weapons on board the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, Morozov said they should be destroyed the same way as other such weapons. "The Black Sea Fleet should be free of nuclear weapons," he affirmed.

Russian Spokesman Discounts Fears of 'Leaks'

PM0204150192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, ITAR-TASS roundup report: "'Nuclear Passions'"]

[Text] The Russian authorities maintain reliable control over the safekeeping of nuclear weapons and their components on the territory of the republic. This was stated today at a briefing held at the Russian Federation Ministry of Security Public Relations Center.

Claims to the contrary which have appeared of late in a number of foreign mass media do not, putting it mildly, correspond to reality.

A. Gurov, first deputy chief of the Public Relations Center, drew attention to the fact that no official inquiries about "leaks" of nuclear weapon components from the CIS have been received by the Russian authorities from Western government or parliamentary circles, or police and other foreign special services. This suggests that the ballyhoo around this questions had been whipped up artificially.

All these "nuclear passions" are part of a propaganda campaign. According to Gurov, this campaign accords with the interests of those who would like to discredit the Russian Government in the eyes of the international

community and establish tight control over the Russian Federation's nuclear industry.

And as for reports about intended exports of enriched uranium from the territory of union republics of the former USSR, this possibility can practically be totally discounted since 100 percent of "weapons-grade uranium" and plutonium is stored on Russia's territory, the briefing participants told journalists.

NATO, East European, CIS States Discuss Tactical Arms

Defense Ministers Meet

*PM0604091992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Report by Aleksandr Sychev: "NATO and Warsaw Pact Set Course for Rapprochement"]

[Text] A one-day meeting of the defense ministers of more than 30 European states and the now independent republics of the former Soviet Union has been held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The only absentees from the meeting were the representatives of France, which does not participate in the work of NATO's military structures, and also of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

As expected, U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney again raised the subject of the fulfillment by Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Russia of their agreement to transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Russian soil before 1 July and for the republics, apart from Russia, to proclaim their nuclear-free status by 1994. On the eve of the session Cheney had secured assurances that "the nuclear four" will fulfill the agreement on tactical arms.

At the session the representatives of Ukraine, Russia, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan confirmed the immutability of the pledges adopted. The chief of the U.S. military department achieved his objective, but only partly. Concerned at the friction that has arisen between Ukraine and Russia over nuclear weapons and at the threat of the nuclear factor being used in relations among the Commonwealth states as a deterrent, the participants in the meeting did not find any relief. At their final news conferences both Ukraine and Russia once again declared that the problem still exists, although there is a possibility of finding an appropriate solution during the time that remains.

I will remind you of the crux of the problem. In the middle of March the Ukrainian Government suspended the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. The pretext was a lack of adequate guarantees that the weapons being pulled out would be destroyed. What Kiev means by guarantees is the setting up of an international commission which would monitor the destruction of short-range missiles and nuclear artillery shells.

General P. Grachev, head of the Russian delegation, rejected international monitoring as being a solution unacceptable to Moscow. He did not explain the Russian position, although outside monitoring is nothing new. Thus, the fulfillment of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles was monitored.

However, there obviously are possibilities for reaching a compromise. In particular, REUTERS reports, Ukrainian Defense Minister K. Morozov has declared that Kiev might consider the possibility of forming a supervisory commission only from representatives of the Commonwealth states.

The CIS states assured the gathering that the Soviet nuclear legacy is under reliable guard and control. In addition, the arguments over the principles for dividing up the former Soviet Army will be settled over the next three months, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces and Arms in Europe will come into force.

Another of the very important topics discussed in Brussels was the expansion of cooperation between the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members. In particular, Cheney did not rule out the possibility of "conducting joint military planning, maneuvers, and preparation of a peacekeeping force" which would operate under CSCE auspices. True, he did not specify when such close cooperation might begin. In addition, NATO offered the new democracies its experience in military planning, the shaping of military budgets, strategy elaboration, and cadre training, and also assistance in converting the military industry and cleaning up the environment in the region of the bases in East Europe which Soviet troops have quit.

Cheney's 'Worthwhile' Involvement Noted

*PM0304150192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by Aleksandr Sychev: "Ukraine and Byelorussia Prepared To Complete Withdrawal of Tactical Nuclear Weapons to Russian Territory"]

[Text] Even if the meeting of defense ministers of the NATO countries and former members of the Warsaw Pact, which opened in Brussels 1 April, does not produce any more results, the outcome of the preliminary conversations between U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney and his counterparts from Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia makes the meeting worthwhile.

That is Western news agencies' assessment of the 31 March conversations in Brussels. The information is that U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney received assurances from his counterparts from the Commonwealth's three nuclear states that they intend to implement the agreement on the transfer of all tactical nuclear armaments to Russian territory, where they will be stored and destroyed.

Colonel General K. Morozov, Ukrainian defense minister, also expressed a willingness to resume the removal of these armaments, which was suspended in mid-March. It is known that the operation, which was to have been completed by 1 July, was suspended due to the absence, or so the Ukrainian Government claimed, of guarantees that these weapons are being destroyed and are not leading to a buildup of the other state's, Russia's in other words, nuclear potential.

So it can be assumed that one of the problems that caused heightened tension between Ukraine and Russia on the one hand, and concern in the West on the other hand, has finally been resolved. But the U.S. secretary of defense does not intend to ease the pressure and he will raise the matter at the actual meeting, which will be attended by more than 30 defense ministers.

In an interview for the journalists accompanying him, Cheney said that he would suggest to Russia that it give Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan the requisite guarantees that Moscow will destroy the tactical weapons stored on its territory and, when left in 1994 as the sole possessor of a nuclear arsenal, it will not use it as a means of blackmailing the other CIS members. In this way Cheney hopes to satisfy Ukrainian conditions for the implementation of the agreement.

Judging by R. Cheney's pronouncements, the United States intends to insist at the ministers' conference on the well-known position that one nuclear power should remain on the territory of the former USSR. It is not just a matter of wanting to keep the membership of the "nuclear club" as it was, with Russia merely taking over the vacant place once occupied by the USSR. The inclusion of new members would inevitably lead to a change in the strategic balance of forces in the world and the emergence of new dangers.

The West is casting an anxious eye over trends that could be regarded as signs that the "cold war" is shifting from the sphere of East-West relations to relations between the now independent states of the CIS. Combined with aggravated nationalist feelings and economic difficulties, it could encourage independent states to keep their present nuclear status and actively utilize the threat of the use of force as an argument in any disputes that may arise. At any rate, Kiev's recent refusal to complete the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia and Kazakhstan's waiting game with regard to its part of the USSR's strategic legacy were viewed in the West from precisely that angle.

"I will make it clear to the four nuclear states of the CIS that U.S. policy is still geared to honoring the commitments they have made," R. Cheney said. Moreover, judging by his interview, the U.S. secretary has the authority to discuss with the Russian delegation the problem of further cuts in strategic nuclear armaments, in particular to return to President B. Yeltsin's proposal on bringing the U.S. and Russian arsenals to the level of approximately 2,500 warheads. In the light of the trends

Washington has noted in the CIS, this proposal clearly acquires new significance now.

In Brussels R. Cheney will also seek from the former Soviet republics confirmation of their agreement to implement the provisions of the 1990 treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments, which is in jeopardy due to the contradictions that have arisen in connection with the principles behind the division of the Soviet Army. There can be no doubt that on this question too he will have the full support not only of the Western countries, but of the former socialist states of East Europe too.

Shaposhnikov Reassures NATO

LD1004190792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1852 GMT 10 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov]

[Text] Brussels April 10 TASS—Commander-in-chief of the CIS Allied Armed Forces Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, who attended a meeting of general headquarters heads from NATO, Eastern Europe and the CIS in Brussels, has met Supreme Allied Commander Europe General John Galvin and chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell.

The sides discussed current developments in the former Soviet Union, as well as the establishment of military cooperation between NATO and the CIS.

They expressed concern over the conflict around the Black Sea Fleet and the suspension of tactical nuclear arms' withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.

The meeting participants also noted the need for observation of previously set terms of location of all CIS-based tactical nuclear arms in Russia for further dismantling.

Shaposhnikov said there are grounds to believe all disputable issues will be solved. Russia and Ukraine have made a step towards each other by suspending their decrees on the Black Sea Fleet. Shaposhnikov confirmed once again all nuclear arms of the former Soviet Union is under reliable control.

The marshal has also met chairman of the NATO military committee Vigleik Eide and head of the Belgian Armed Forces' General Headquarters Joseph Charlier.

Today Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov left Brussels for Moscow.

Byelarusian Premier on Tactical, Strategic Arms Removal

LD1404093592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0800 GMT 14 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Bukalov]

[Excerpt] Rome April 14 TASS—Visiting Byelarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich told ITAR-TASS Byelarus will be a nuclear-free and neutral state.

He emphasised that Byelarus has the principled and unchanged stance on this issue, it reflects the point of view of the republic's government, parliament and the public.

This means that all nuclear weapons on Byelarusian soil will sooner or later be eliminated. The point is that the republic does not have the necessary facilities to destroy

these weapons: the only plant that destroys nuclear warheads is located on Russia's territory. We will wait for our turn to move these weapons beyond our borders for destruction, Kebich said.

He said this operation would take from two to three years. Byelarus will not possess tactical nuclear weapons already this year. Only strategic weapons will be left on its soil and how soon these weapons will be destroyed will ultimately depend on Russia, he stressed. [passage omitted]

AUSTRIA

Foreign Minister Seeks Yugoslav Disarmament Conference

AU1404124292 Vienna DER STANDARD
in German 14 Apr 92 p 2

[Georg Possaner report: "Disarmament Initiative for the Balkans"]

[Text] Vienna—Austria will present a plan for a disarmament conference in the conflict region of the former Yugoslavia to the chairman of the EC peace conference, Lord Carrington, and is trying to win support for this idea among the CSCE and the UN Security Council.

Foreign Minister Alois Mock announced this initiative in an interview with DER STANDARD yesterday.

According to Mock's plans, the presidents of the republics of the former Yugoslavia should participate in peace talks headed by Lord Carrington for which the successful Vienna negotiations on conventional troop reduction should serve as a model.

Details of the initiative are being drafted at the Foreign Ministry, Mock stated. "I will approach Lord Carrington in the next few days and discuss with him parallel steps that might be taken by the UN Security Council or the CSCE to support this initiative."

Mock proceeds from the existing labor division within the international crisis management for the former Yugoslavia.

The UN Security Council is responsible for brokering a cease-fire. The EC and affiliated institutions have been assigned the task of finding a long-term political solution. Thus, the EC also supported the dispatch of EC observers, the minister stressed.

In the interview with DER STANDARD, Foreign Minister Mock mentioned three reasons for his initiative in the Baltics:

- The flooding of the territory of the former Yugoslavia with troops and weapons is an essential factor of instability in this region.
- If disarmament talks are being held within the framework of the CSCE anyway, they should become effective in regions where unrest prevails and casualties occur.
- A several-stage disarmament process should lead to a balanced and the lowest possible armament level among the armed forces of the international recognized states. The "complete disarmament of the uncontrolled guerrillas" is particularly important.

Referring to the most recent developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the foreign minister stated: "The question is how long the EC, the United States, and the UN

Security Council can accept the destruction of a state that has been recognized internationally by a foreign army.

FRANCE

Mitterrand Stance on Nuclear Deterrent Viewed

PM1604064092 Paris LE MONDE in French
14 Apr 92 p 15

[Jacques Amalric report: "Deterring Whom?"]

[Text] "France's defense is still based essentially on its nuclear force.... That is the weapon which prevents wars." "There is now just one military force (I will not say a bloc but a military force), and that is the one of which we are a member, in other words the Atlantic Alliance."

These two statements made several moments apart on Sunday evening by the president of the republic are surely ultimately inconsistent. Is it not rather obstinate to continue to regard as "essential" and the "cornerstone" of the French defense system—to cite the expression used by Pierre Bérégovoy to the National Assembly—a deterrent force which no longer has any potential enemy to deter?

Mr. Mitterrand is well aware of that. That is why, without fear of contradicting himself, at the end of his explanations on the suspension of nuclear tests, he referred to the need for France to "diversify its priorities" in the defense sphere. Was that not an admission that there ought henceforth to be several "priorities" and that the nuclear deterrent, which helped maintain peace in Europe during the 40 years of the cold war, can no longer be the alpha and omega of French security in the future?

In that case, why not proclaim this clearly? Why not launch the debate which will sooner or later have to be held on the place of the nuclear deterrent in France's defense doctrine? First because the control of the deterrent force is an essential attribute of the president of the republic, a point which Mr. Mitterrand emphasized again on Sunday evening. Admitting that the deterrent is now no longer "operating" as before is an admission of the erosion of a mythical power.

The second reason for the president's reservations lies in the hybrid nature of the French deterrent, which is both a diplomatic and a military weapon. Questioning its role would amount to questioning France's famous "rank" in the world, which is now based on an obsolete order. Mr. Mitterrand clearly does not think this is the right time to do so when a large number of French people are already troubled by the additional "abandonment of sovereignty" involved in the Maastricht treaty. Indeed, how can he explain to them that the "nuclear resource" is being exhausted as are the moral and international privileges (such as the permanent membership in the

Security Council) which we owe to the obstinacy of General de Gaulle and his diplomats who struggled in 1945 to win for France the status of victor in World War II?

Mr. Mitterrand therefore prefers discreet maneuvering to the real but difficult debate: The defense funding devoted to nuclear weapons is reduced, questions are asked in the inner circle but to satisfy the people they say that things have not changed and that France is still one of the "most powerful countries in the world." At the same time, through the suspension of the nuclear tests, the president of the republic is trying to turn a weakness into an advantage: Maintaining, through disarmament, the "club" of nations which stand above the others because of nuclear weapons. But this is a very risky exercise, which is not really compatible with the establishment of a European defense unless the future of the French deterrent is openly tackled.

He is already encountering open hostility from the United States which last fall opposed the plan for a conference of nuclear powers put forward by Mr. Mitterrand to supervise the denuclearization of the republics of the former USSR, aside from Russia. And, since then, the U.S. Administration has made it known that it would continue nuclear tests and has made no secret of its intention to handle the Soviet nuclear issue alone—an issue which is proving more difficult than expected: Russia has suspended its tests but, contrary to its promises, is finding it very difficult to "bring back" the tactical and strategic weapons deployed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus; and it is having even greater technical problems in dismantling them.

Proposing negotiations in these conditions is probably asking for an outright American rejection. Washington hopes to solve the failure of the former USSR by unilateral reductions and pressures of all kinds. Ultimately, it regards France's nuclear obstinacy as doomed. Surely the best response would be for Paris to calmly and unilaterally reassess the risks, threats, and needs, which would certainly not mean the end of deterrence but would make it possible to take account of the end of its omnipotence.

Defense Minister: Army To Be Cut by 30,000 in 1993

LD1604135492 Paris Antenne-2 Television Network
in French 1100 GMT 16 Apr 92

[Text] The numbers of the French Army will be cut by about 30,000 in 1993, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe announced this morning to the Defense Commission at the National Assembly. Joxe believes that these cuts are necessary, inevitable, and even useful for the future well-being of France's Armed Forces.

Russia To Receive Help To Destroy Nuclear Arms

PM1604090092 Paris LE MONDE in French
16 Apr 92 p4

[Unattributed report: "France Has Talks With Moscow on Ways of Helping It To Dismantle Its Nuclear Arms"]

[Text] Following a mission to Moscow by Gerard Renon, former secretary of state for defense and former administrator of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), France and Russia have just resumed their talks on the aid which the French can give the Russians in destroying their nuclear weapons. French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe and Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the armed forces of the CIS announced this in Paris on Tuesday 14 April. "If French technology," the marshal said, "is the most acceptable, it is natural for us to adopt it."

A working group has been set up for this purpose. The aim for the two countries is to cooperate initially on safety in the transportation and storage of the weapons. After that, Russian experts would dismantle the weapons themselves. France, whose AEC has recognized competence in this sphere, could then help Russia in the reprocessing and, possibly, peaceful reutilization of the fissionable material.

On an official visit to France from Monday 13 to Friday 17 April, Marshal Shaposhnikov addressed students at the Military Academy. Expressing opposition to direct involvement at the present stage of CIS forces in ethnic and territorial conflicts in the former USSR, he explained to them: "We do not want to be accused of making and unmaking governments at gunpoint."

If an intervention force were to be formed on the basis of the decisions made last March by the various CIS heads of state, Marshal Shaposhnikov thinks it must be "a special contingent with a special command under the authority of the council of heads of state." This force should only intervene at the request of the two sides involved.

Accompanied to Dijon by Mr. Joxe, the commander in chief of the CIS armed forces, who is himself a pilot, made a 50-minute flight on Tuesday on board a two-seater Mirage-2000 air defense plane. He is due to visit Toulon to see the Mediterranean squadron and the Foch aircraft carrier, and then to Saumur to see the armored and cavalry division academy.

Marshal Shaposhnikov will be received on Friday by Prime Minister Pierre Bereznev before leaving for Moscow.

GERMANY

Defense Minister Urges Destroying NVA Equipment

LD1204075892 Hamburg DPA in German 0500 GMT
12 Apr 92

Bonn (DPA)—New Defense Minister Volker Ruehe now wants to mostly scrap the military equipment of the former National People's Army [NVA], thus also sending a disarmament policy signal. In a DPA interview in Bonn today, Ruehe said weapons systems must not be allowed to fall into the wrong hands. Any misuse must be ruled out in future. "The scrapping of the equipment has precedence over selling it," Ruehe said. The Bundeswehr will spend 148 million German marks on scrapping this year. In 1993, 220 million German marks have already been earmarked for this. The weapons will be scrapped using environmentally sound methods.

Ruehe said the quantity of NVA material sold so far to friendly states is "minimal compared with the scale of equipment taken over." Only a very limited proportion of the equipment can be used for civilian purposes or utilized for humanitarian aid at home and abroad. Ruehe pointed out, for example, that around 15,000 combat tanks, armored combat vehicles, and guns, as well as 223,000 tonnes of ammunition will be scrapped. He hopes that he will have the political support of all the parties if yet more money has to be spent on the scrapping. Nonmilitary material is to be passed on for humanitarian purposes even more quickly.

Ruehe made it clear that he is striving for "close and good cooperation" with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in security policy issues and disarmament efforts and stated: "We are both federal ministers in a successful government who have committed themselves to a joint task." Security and disarmament policy belong together. Great successes have already been scored in disarmament, "but apart from the quantitative disarmament which has already been agreed, we must now also introduce qualitatively new steps." Ruehe pointed out that of all the CSCE treaty signatory states, the Federal Republic will make the second biggest contribution in reducing weapons.

Ruehe strongly emphasized that he wants to see to it quickly that the Bundeswehr soldiers are given fresh motivation and "meaning" in their service. He wants to seek "personal talks" with soldiers on visits to barracks and sites. Referring to the Defense Ministry's situation, Ruehe underlined that he can rely on "many good and motivated staff members." He is certain of their loyalty. He wants to start discussions with the soldiers before Easter during an initial troop visit in northern Germany.

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Secretary Unveils First Trident Submarine

92WC0044A London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 5 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Peter Almond, defence correspondent: "Vanguard Inches Britain Into New Age of Nuclear Defence"]

[Text] At the touch of a button, Mr. King, Defence Secretary, sent Britain into a new nuclear era yesterday when the first Trident submarine was unveiled.

Matt black, massive and utterly menacing, Vanguard was "rolled out" at Barrow-in-Furness to the strains of Strauss's Thus Spake Zarathustra—theme to the film 2001—played by the VSEL [Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering LTD] shipyard band.

At 16,000 tons, Vanguard's displacement is twice that of any of the Polaris submarines it will begin to replace from 1995.

Its 16 Trident D5 missiles and a maximum of 128 warheads pack twice the punch of the Polaris vessels, which have 16 missiles fitted with three warheads.

Each of the four Vanguard class submarines being built at Barrow will be able to fire ballistic missiles with a range of 6,500 miles and with 960 times the explosive power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

Political opponents and anti-nuclear protesters at the gates of the yard said this British "escalation" was incompatible with the end of the Cold War and fears of nuclear proliferation, but Mr. King insisted: "Much uncertainty remains and it is essential that we maintain our strong defence.

"In particular, the vast strategic nuclear arsenal that was the Soviet Union's is now dispersed into four separate republics, and there is a great risk of proliferation of their nuclear weapons to other countries in the world.

"Our independent strategic nuclear deterrent has been the ultimate guarantee of our security. In these uncertain times Trident will assume that role."

Cheered on by hundreds of blue-overalled workers from VSEL (Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd.), Vanguard which is 491 feet long, 42 feet deep and 39.4 feet wide, took much of the day to inch its way out of the purpose-built Devonshire Dock Hall on 410 railway wheels.

The submarine is due to be lowered into the water on a special shiplift today. It will be formally named, probably by a member of the Royal Family, in late April.

It will be late this year before Vanguard's new PWR2 nuclear reactor becomes critical, and at least late 1995 before it can make its first operational cruise.

Twenty-six American-made D5 missiles have been ordered so far, and some of the British-made warheads are believed to be ready.

Next to Vanguard in the Devonshire Dock Hall, opened by Mrs. Thatcher when Vanguard's keel was laid in 1986, stood the second and third Trident vessels, each approximately a year behind the other in completion.

VSEL and Navy officials confirm that building of the fourth, and most controversial, Trident submarine is

almost ready to begin. More than £140 million of the £500 million cost has already been spent in "long lead" items. The reactor core has been bought, 13 of the 16 missile tubes have been built and many hull sections are ready.

Navy officials say only £400 million out of the Trident project's total £10 billion cost would be saved by cancelling the fourth vessel. Yesterday Mr. Noel Davies, chief executive of VSEL, said the savings would be no more than £250 million.

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